[EM] CC, Co-operation/Defection, definitions of Approval and VoteFair
Michael Ossipoff
email9648742 at gmail.com
Tue May 8 14:59:50 PDT 2012
First, a co-operation/defection problem example at the opposite extreme:
Sincere preferences:
33: A>B
32: B>A
34: C
Now, replying to Richard:
Richard says:
Instead of publishing my "rebuttal" as an article, here is what I
suggest. Adrian, in his own words, can introduce Mike's article by
saying that the article is about one of many voting methods
[endquote]
At no time did I say that Approval was the only votinlg method.
Richard continues:
and about one of many characteristics of voting methods (FBC).
[endquote]
My article mentioned that Approval doesn't give favorite-burial incentive,
and
tells why that's important, but the revised version, the one that was
published,
makes no mention of the name "FBC".
Richard thinks that I should explain that there are other properties by
which to evaluate
and compare methods, but I didn't say or imply that there weren't.
I recommend that anyone should feel free, when proposing
or describing a method, to tell what desirable properties it has. ...as
did I.
Richard continues:
Ideally I would hope that Mike recognizes that his article fails to
describe Approval voting in a way that would be understood by most
readers of Democracy Chronicles
[endquote]
Well, let's see...I suggested that the voter be allowed to give to each
candidate a rating of "Approved" or "Unapproved",
and that the candidate with the most "Approved" ratings wins.
Which part of that does Richard have trouble with?
Richard continues:
And I think that using an example
of people raising hands or saying "yes" makes it easy to understand, and
encourages people to try using it.
[endquote]
I like the illustrtion of an Approval ballot, which Adrian included. That
showing of an Approval
ballot helps to clarify what Approval voting is like.
Richard continues:
I would think that Mike would want
people to try it to see how simple it is, and to give people an
opportunity to experience how it works better than plurality voting.
[endquote]
Of course. But I don't know if Democracy Chronicles is set up for that sort
of interactive balloting.
By the way, I did propose a poll at EM a few months ago, for that very
purpose (not just for Approval,
but for rank-balloting too).
At EM, we've done a number of presidential polls, and at least two polls
regarding voting systems. Most of them
were proposed by me.
Now that we're on the subject of polls: Richard keeps saying that, these
days, he hears more in favor of CC than FBC.
...and he probably hears more advocacy of Condorcet (versions not usually
specified) than of Approval.
EM's constantly shifting participating-memberts mix will sometimes favor
Condorcet, and sometimes Approval.
Richard suggested a poll. As I've said, we had at least two polls on voting
systems. Two that I know of. Maybe they were the
only ones.
In the first such poll, the winner was Smith//Condorcet, the best Condorcet
version we knew of at the time. In 2nd place was
Plain Condorcet, now more often referred to as "MinMax(wv). They won by
every method we counted.
That poll held fairly soon after I introduced the Condorcet(wv) family of
voting systems. Condorcet(wv) has become the
predominant and popular class or family of Condorcet versions, and
inludes Markus Schultz's now popular CSSD/Beatpath version of
Condorcet(wv).
In our other voting systems poll, Approval won, by every method we counted.
So, you see, a voting systems poll is just a snapshot of one momentary
configuration of EM's constantly shifting active-poster
mix.
In all of our polls, presidential and on voting systems, Approval always
chose the CW. Warren Smith has spoken of why that
tends to be so.
By the way, Richard, when you keep referring to the Condorcet's Criterion
advocates heard from so much these days, would
you, by any chance, be referring to Dave Ketchum and Robert Bristow?
Forest Simpson isn't participating these days, but he was for a long time,
and he is an Approvalist, though he discusses many
interesting ideas about other methods too. Forest also likes MCA and MTA.
He was the introducer of MCA, which led to MTA.
Approval, MCA, and MTA meet FBC, but not Condorcet's Criterion.
As recently as a few months ago there was an another Approvalist active on
EM, but
who is no longer participating. As I said--snapshots of a constantly
shifting membership.
Look at the credentialled signers list, of the Declaration. You'll find
Approval well-represented.
By the way, Richard, though your VoteFair is defined at your website, is
there some reason why you don't want to post
its definition to EM?
Richard says:
There is no need to mention the Condorcet criteria [criterion] , as long as
Mike does
not make any false claims about it
[endquote]
Richard is invited to specify a false claim that I've made about
Condorcdt's Criterion.
Richard says:
, which I think that Adrian can now
identify as opinions rather than mathematically supported facts.
[endquote]
Richard is invited to _specifically_ name a mathematically incorrect
statement that
I've made about Condorcet's Criterion.
...or a statement or opinion that I've made, which needs mathematical
support
that I've failed to provide upon request. (For one thing, I haven't heard
any requests prior to this
message).
But it's pointless to ask Richard to specify what he means. Vagueness is
his standard technique.
Mike Ossipoff
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