[EM] Obvious Approval advantages. SODA. Approval-Runoff.

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/3/9 Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>

> Hi,
>
>   *De :* Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>
> *À :* Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>; election-methods <
> election-methods at electorama.com>
> *Envoyé le :* Vendredi 9 mars 2012 17h04
> *Objet :* Re: [EM] Obvious Approval advantages. SODA. Approval-Runoff.
>
> At 07:36 PM 3/8/2012, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> > Hi Mike,
> >
> > I don't think Approval-Runoff can get off the ground since it's too
> > apparent that a party could nominate two candidates (signaling that one
> > is just a pawn to aid the other) and try to win by grabbing both of the
> > finalist positions. If this happened regularly it would be just an
> > expensive version of FPP.
>
> Number one. This objection does not apply to nonpartisan elections.
>
>
> Not sure why it couldn't. You just wouldn't have a party, as
> such, executing the strategy.
>
>
> Number two. The strongest factor in elections is positive name
> recognition. That's become obvious. By running two candidates, you are
> diluting name recognition. If you have one, you might win. With two, quite
> possibly not. Risky strategy.
>
>
> Possibly true.
>
>
> Number three. The strategy assumes that there will be no rivalry between
> the two candidates. Even if they are in cahoots, their supporters may not
> be.
>
>
> You'd pick a second candidate who doesn't have supporters.
>
>
>
> Number four. Who gets the campaign funds?
>
>
> It's a single campaign, so it doesn't matter. Presumably the serious
> nominee gets them.
>
>
>
> Number five. Others can play the same game, if it's a real strategy. I
> don't think it is.
>
>
> I was actually assuming everybody (at least major candidates) would play
> the same game. The problem
> is that the second round doesn't play the role it was supposed to if this
> happens.
>
>
>
> Number six. If this is a partisan election, who gets the party slot? The
> strategy could badly backfire, as supporters of the non-party candidate
> decide not to support the official party candidate, after all, the party
> made a bad choice. No, the tradition is strong, and there are strong
> reasons for it, that a party unites on a candidate. It's more powerful.
>
>
> This seems to be the same as number three.
>
>
>
> Number seven. If both candidates make it into the runoff, very good chance
> one of them would win anyway. This means that they are top two, really. If
> this is nonpartisan, very difficult to reverse that.
>
>
> The intention of the first round is to pick two finalists who are likely
> to be the best winner. So if one finalist
> gets both positions by running a weak clone, his odds of being the one who
> would have won "anyway" are
> probably better than half, yes. The criticism is that the second round
> serves little purpose if that's what is
> happening.
>
>
> Number eight. You might be able to figure out a scenario where this makes
> some sense.
>
> Now, compare that scenario with the real and known hazard of center
> squeeze.
>
>
>  And where should that lead me? You know that nobody is backed into a
> corner where they have to
> advocate either an approval runoff or nothing.
>
>
>
> Besides, once we are Counting All the Votes, a ranked version of approval
> becomes far better.
>
>
> My simulations do often find that specific rank/approval hybrids are the
> best wrt minimizing insincerity and
> electing sincere CWs and utility maximizers. It depends on the scenario,
> but JGA's Approval-Weighted
> Pairwise is often the best Condorcet method and my various "Single
> Contest" methods are usually the
> best non-Condorcet ones (especially wrt sincerity).
>

Note that Kevin still hasn't run simulations for SODA, because it requires
assumptions about candidate strategy, and has different ballot types than
other systems. Kevin, I haven't forgotten about resolving those issues with
you; I think that they can be worked out.

Jameson


>
> "Single Contest" methods are actually like an instant approval runoff,
> except the finalists are the two
> candidates who together minimize the number of voters who approved neither
> of them.
>
> Kevin
>
>
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>
>
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