[EM] Reply to Lomax

[Jameson Quinn]

Abd, I can't match your stamina, but I can suggest you take a serious
second look at SODA. It has a significant fraction of the advantages of
Asset and runoffs, without those. Asset, because it's delegated; and
runoffs, because it a stage (using the delegated votes) which happens after
the votes are counted, when it's clear who could really win.

Yes, I understand that in both cases these advantages are diluted. But in
return for that dilution, you get one-round decisiveness and ballot
simplicity, which are both things that voters like.

Jameson

2012/3/9 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>

> At 03:44 PM 3/3/2012, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>
>
>  Abd:
>>
>> I might post this when it's only partially finished, and then continue it
>> Monday.
>>
>
> I didn't see it when this first went up. I did notice a later post, and
> agreed with most of what you wrote there, Mike. So let's see where you were
> wrong here. Isn't that the goal, to show that the other person is wrong?
>
> Seriously, I hope not.
>
>
>  You wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> At 04:55 PM 3/1/2012, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>>>
>>> >If you rank your favorite, F,  in 1st place, s/he gets a majority,
>>> >even though s/he doesn't win, because someone else has a higher
>>> >majority.
>>>
>>> That's apparently quite unusual. Even if multple votes in first rank
>>> are allowed -- they certainly should be -- most voters will not use them.
>>>
>>
>>
>> You don't have sufficient information to make that prediction.
>>
>
> Sure I do. There are some scenarios that can be asserted that can lead to
> a conclusion that if overvoting is allowed in first rank, voters will use
> it strategically. Otherwise, from what we know about Approval Voting, and
> from the history of Bucklin in certian elections, I *predict* that most
> voters won't use them. Mike, do you have sufficient information to show
> that this is unlikely to be true?
>
>
>  Yes, the IRVists point out that, when Bucklin was used in the early
>> 20th century, few if any voters would even rank a 2nd choice.
>>
>
> That was misleading on FairVote's part. Bucklin was used initially in
> public elections, with lots of candidates. Overvoting was prohibited in
> first rank, but maybe one-third of voters, as I recalled, did not add
> additional preferences. What we do know from those elections, though, is
> that a fair number of voters who did add additional preferences skipped the
> second rank and only added a vote in the third rank.
> These were obviously voters who had a relatively strong preference. It
> makes sense as a "sincere strategy."
>
>
>   My answer
>> to that is that plumping is a valid good strategy if no one but your
>> favorite
>> is acceptable to you, or if you're sure that s/he will win if you don't
>> rank
>> anyone else.
>>
>
> "Plumping" here means? I get two possible meanings. It means bullet
> voting, entirely, or it means only voting for one in first rank.
>
> Many voters only care about voting for their favorite, no matter what
> system you give them, unless you *force* them to add additional
> preferences. Indeed, that was the thinking behind Carroll's invention of
> Asset Voting.
>
>
>  Those were only municipal elections, of course. You can't use them to
>> predict
>> voting in national or state elections. In important elections, people
>> would soon
>> learn what voting strategy is in their best interest.
>>
>
> Let's start with small scale elections, eh? First of all, there are as yet
> no national elections in the U.S., the largest jurisdiction to hold an
> election is a state. What we think of as presidential elections are
> actually local elections of pledged electors.
>
> There is a lot of crap out there on what strategy is in the voter's best
> interest, and there is a large class of voters who vote for what is in the
> society's best interest (in their opinion, of course, but these voters will
> value *consensus* and will recognize that getting their own preference is
> not necessarily best for the society).
>
> The importance of an election is subjective, and where it has an impact is
> in the mind of the voter. The influence of what is casually and
> incautiously called "strategic voting" is very poorly established. Some
> kinds of "strategy" are quite obvious: with Range, vote at least one
> candidate maximum, and one minimum. The rest is mostly speculation.
>
> I did do a limited study comparing approval-style voting with the voting
> of an intermediate vote, when the intermediate vote was assumed to be fully
> sincere, i.e., this was a three candidate election, Range 2, and the voter
> had zero knowledge and sincere normalized ratings of 0, 1, and 2 for the
> candidates. It turned out that the expected value of the election was the
> same whether the voter voted approval style (either choice!, i.e., plumping
> or ) or full range. However, *that the intermediate vote was allowed*,
> improved the overall expected utility for the voter *even if the voter did
> not use it.* (Obviously, as long as someone else did, at least one voter).
> My speculation was that it did this through dithering.
>
> But real elections are not zero-knowledge, and so some kind of voting
> strategy is necessary if the voter wants to optimize the power of their
> vote. That means shifting Range votes to von Neumann-Morganstern utilities.
> We instinctively do this, even though it's a big word. We don't waste
> voting power on irrelevant options.
>
> I'll assert that voters want a system that is easy to understand, and that
> reasonably takes into account their vote(s). They would rather not break
> their head trying to figure out some totally-optimal strategy. Favorite
> Betrayal, as to what it means in fully ranked systems, is offensive to most
> voters, but what can be called FB in Approval isn't offensive, it is normal
> compromise.
>
> And you won't do it, with Bucklin-ER, if you have a significant
> preference. Unless there is a very weird situation.
>
>
>  It seems to me that, in ABucklin, most people's best strategy would often
>> or usually
>> be to just vote certain candidates in 1st place, and not rank anyone else.
>>
>
> Well, whether it is "best" or not, that is how many voters will vote,
> because it is what they know to do. They will only add additional
> preferences in first rank if they really have little preference between
> those candidates.
>
> Now, as to the FairVote deception. Most people in the full-public Bucklin
> elections did add additional preferences, I think it may have been about
> two-thirds. FairVote cites the remaining Bucklin implementations, the last
> to go, which were party primaries. Again, many voters will only know one of
> the candidates, and political activists, more highly represented in a party
> primary, will be more likely to bullet vote, they already have a strong
> favorite, and are working for that election!
>
> Further, FairVote's core support criterion makes some sense when we are
> talking about a party election. Which candidate has put together the
> biggest election machine?
>
> But this has practically nothing to do with public elections. From the
> history, we can expect to see, on ballots with significant numbers of
> candidates, voters who approve more than one, on the ballot. Only with very
> large candidate lists, with high uncertainty as to who is leading, would
> there ever be a substantial motive to add additional approvals in first
> rank, unless -- very important exception -- the voter has some difficulty
> figuring out which of a number of approved candidates is the best. Then
> voting for more than one in first rank *makes complete and total sense.*
>
>
>
>  You continued:
>>
>> Sequential approval voting, i.e., a series of polls where voters
>> start out with "insisting on their favorite," and then gradually
>> lower their approval cutoff until a majority is found, is simply a
>> more efficient version of what is standard deliberative process,
>> i.e., vote-for-one majority-required, repeated until a majority is found
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> I have nothing against that, but it would be expensive for large public
>> elections.
>> ABucklin, would be a perfectly good substitute. AOCBucklin would be
>> better.
>>
>
> You are making assumptions about "public elections." Voting systems are
> general. Full sequential approval voting is used for elections at meetings,
> and could be practical with on-line elections, i.e., wherever it is
> practical and inexpensive to rapidly hold multiple ballots.
>
> Public elections, two ballots is probably the tolerable limit. Obviously,
> finding a majority has been important enough to many that they cost has
> been considered worthwhile.
>
> What is possible with Bucklin/Runoff is that each poll can simulate a
> series of Approval elections with declining approval cutoff. Let me hasten
> to note that the name "Bucklin/Runoff" is quite imprecise here. It should
> not be assumed that the primary result is simply the top two -- if no
> majority is found. It could be *way* more sophisticated than that.
>
> And the ballot could be a full-on Range ballot. And I would add additional
> information in any case: the ballots should, by some means or other,
> specify an approval cutoff. Approval has an easy meaning in game theory: it
> means "I prefer the election of this candidate to the expense and possible
> risk of a runoff election."
>
>
>  You continued:
>>
>> In any case, to me, if the number of ballots were not to be limited,
>> I'd want to see Range polling, with explicit approval cutoff, plus a
>> ratification vote that explicitly approves the result.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> More expensive still. A good proposal would propose only one balloting.
>>
>
> Again, I'm talking about the ideal, expense aside. This is a practical
> suggestion, though.
>
> But here I'm going to take very strong exception. Limiting an election
> method to a single ballot, making it deterministic on the ballots in a
> single poll, is probably the most damaging single aspect of present public
> elections. You would never do this in person. You would insist, and
> organizations do insist -- it's Robert's Rules -- on a majority approval of
> a result, however that is obtained. Robert's Rules disapproves of even mail
> elections by a plurality, they would have the organization repeat the
> election, and that is a repeat with new nominations, the whole nine yards.
> *And that is even with the use of a preferential ballot.*
>
> However, it is possible to design a ballot and system that will, with a
> modest number of candidates, complete *almost always* in a single poll.
> Bucklin did this with some significant candidate numbers! It only failed
> later, in party primaries. And the simple reform there should have been to
> go to top two runoff, with a Bucklin primary. Instead they just went to top
> two runoff. Live and learn.
>
>
>  You continued:
>>
>>  In some
>> organizations, a mere majority margin, thin, really isn't desirable,
>> it should be better than that. Popes were elected by repeated
>> approval polling, two-thirds majority required. But I'd prefer to
>> leave it to the majority to decide what margin is needed. Otherwise
>> it is the *rules* which are in charge. I.e., the past is ruling the
>> present, which I'm learning is not a great idea, for many reasons.
>> Informing and suggesting, yes, but ruling, no.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> ???
>>
>> Ok, I and those who agree with me have a 51% majority. So you ask us how
>> large a
>> majority should be required, and we reply (guess what) "51%".
>>
>
> No, the standard understanding is "majority," i.e., more than half. Under
> Robert's Rules, that is more than half of all non-blank ballots. That's not
> a mere detail. A non-blank ballot has been "voted," and RR wants to see a
> majority of votes for a winner.
>
> Look, I'm here talking about social structure. I know of organizations
> that require full consensus for any decision. Bad idea, long term. (But it
> can work spectacularly short-term, that's why people do it.) Others have
> been very successful with *advisory structures* that require "substantial
> consensus," typically considered a two-thirds majority as a minimum, and
> they work hard to compromise and make that higher.
>
> My own conclusion has been that the majority properly has -- always -- the
> right of decision, and the majority can decide whether to continue
> negotiating or accept a result as "good enough." Without that, requiring a
> higher margin for the right of decision, leads to minority rule whenever
> the status quo favors a sufficient minority. I think I said it, did you
> notice, Mike. "I'd prefer to leave it to the majority to decide what margin
> is needed."
>
>
>
>  I'm not sure how or why you'd implement the flexible majority-magnitude
>> requirement
>> that you suggest.
>>
>
> I didn't suggest it. But there are organizations and situations where it
> might be useful. This was dicta, Mike, not the central argument.
>
>
>
>  >A number of people rank F, and, if you help F get a majority, then
>> >they won't give a vote to their next choice.
>> >
>> >That's regrettable, because their next choice could win with those
>> >votes, while F can't win. And when their next choice doesn't win,
>> >someone worse than s/he (as judged by you) wins.
>> >
>> >You got a worse result because you didn't favorite-bury.
>>
>> You reply:
>>
>> Mike, I'm not sure I'm following you here, but the situation,
>> multiple majorities in the first round, would be indicative of a
>> highly unusual context.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Maybe. FBC-failure won't be common in Beatpath either. But it's possible.
>> It's likewise
>> possible in Stepwise-to-Majority. In any method where there could be a
>> situation where
>> your best outcome can only be gotten by favorite-burial, you can't assure
>> people that they
>> have no need for favorite-burial. I believe that voters have shown us, in
>> elections and in
>> straw-polls, that it's absolutely necessary to assure voters that it's
>> entirely impossible
>> for there be to be a situation where they can get their best outcome only
>> by favorite-burial.
>>
>
> There is no wide public experience with this. Sure, we should always
> design systems to avoid undesirable outcomes, if possible. But you can
> also, just about always, design a scenario that makes a method look bad,
> i.e., there is, we will assert, a *possible* outcome. Even if the
> probablity of that outcome is such that it is, effectively, impossible,
> won't happen in a million years. Probably!
>
> I'm sorry, most people will definitely not be thinking of a "need for
> Favorite Betrayal," unless they have seen an actual election where they got
> burned and are presented with a possible repeat. But multiple approvals is
> not a sensible meaning for Favorite Betrayal, and yes, Mike, I'm aware that
> you invented the criterion.
>
> And most people will be highly suspicious of anyone who suggests that they
> not vote sincerely.
>
> Approval improves election process over Plurality, and Bucklin takes
> approval and allows multiple approvals without the need to equally rank.
> People loved the method, Mike, that's obvious from the history. They did
> not think like FairVote activists would have them think.
>
>
>
>
>  You said:
>>
>> Let's see if I understand.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> I meant what I said, nothing more or less.
>>
>
> Aw, Mike, that's trolling for a putdown. Stop it! If you do what you just
> said you do, you are phenomenally unique. Nobody *ever* does that. You can
> mean what you say, but what does that mean? Well, what I said. But you
> already said it. The statement adds no information, but "meaning" is
> complex for humans, there are always aspects to it that we haven't
> expressed, and it would take, shall we say, a very long time to complete.
> And might still be impossible.
>
> But you might mean this in some special way that makes it true. But why
> did you say it? I was commenting that I was taking a look at what what you
> had said *meant to me*, and you then can say, "Yes, you understand," or
> "No, you don't," and we can then move on.
>
>
>
>  But the first thing you should understand is that I've already said that
>> my
>> FBC failiure scenario doesn't work for ABucklin. ABucklin apparently
>> passes FBC.
>> I now am convinced that it does, and that there's good reason to believe
>> that a
>> failure example cannot be found for ABucklin.
>>
>> The failure we're talking about, therefore, is only that of
>> Stepwise-to-Majority.
>>
>
> I want something to be understood. If we have Bucklin/Runoff, or
> Range/runoff, or IdealPrimaryMethod/runoff, there will be people who will
> suppress voting for a candidate until the last round. It's simplest to
> start with Approval/Runoff. The existence of a majority requirement, or
> something like that, in the primary, and the possibility of a runoff will
> encourage voters to vote more "selfishly" in the primary. If they have to
> compromise, they will do it in the runoff. But runoffs have a cost. The
> voter must go to the trouble of voting again. And about one-third of
> runoffs reverse the position shown in the primary (with TTR). So there is a
> cost and risks of postponing adding additional approvals. That is helpful!
> It causes the voting to have some pressure toward compromise.
> Now, say that the election is majority required in the primary, to
> complete, but some kind of plurality approval result is possible in the
> runoff. Suppose the primary and the runoff use, otherwise, the same method.
> A Bucklin method, if stepwise toward majority, in this system, will have
> split the ranks into two elections, effectively. In the first election, one
> would be unlikely to approve a candidate if the disapproval of that
> candidate was serious enough that one would prefer to see the election go
> into runoff.
>
> By definition, a majority-requited in the primary with a runoff is
> "stepwise to majority," though it might not find a majority in the runoff.
> (And methods that pretend to find a majority by severely restricting
> candidacies in the runoff are doing just that. Pretending. The real
> democratic election process is step-wise to majority through an unlimited
> number of steps, with no restrictions on candidacy (other than raw
> eligibility) at each step. It is an iterative, intelligent process, and the
> voters communicate with each other between each poll. Candidates withdraw,
> new candidates are added.
>
> And public elections should emulate this to the degree possible, within
> practical limitations.
>
> The only method that *almost completely* emulates it is Asset, with decent
> post-poll structure (which the holders of the Assets can create, the
> structure for actually determining that a majority has been found could be
> very simple.)
>
>
>
>> You continued:
>>
>> If you vote for your Favorite in first
>> place, someone else has a higher majority, call him or her A. In the
>> first round? There is a third candidate who has a lesser majority, B,
>> whom you prefer to A.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> B might not have hir majority yet. S/he might get it when the other
>> voters I
>> spoke of give votes to their next choice, in the next round.
>>
>
> I postulated it. Or, altenrnatively, I expect it, from the next round, as
> you say.
>
>
>
>  You continued:
>>
>> If you vote for B in first rank, they might tie
>> the other majority candidate.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Or, then again, they might not. In general, "might" isn't good enough for
>> timid
>> overcompromisers.
>>
>
> Of course they might not. And a tornado might blow away all the ballots,
> or not.
>
>
>
>  You continued:
>>
>> I tend to think of my own votesg as
>> being representative of a class of voters, i.e., what I do, others
>> may do
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Of course.
>>
>> You continued:
>>
>> , so this might flip the result to B, an improvement from my perspective.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> "Might" won' do.
>>
>
> Actually, you are quite correct, but I don't think you realize the
> implications. I'm describing the possible strategic motivation that makes
> Bucklin fail FBC. You may be able to improve the outcome by upranking B, to
> equally rank B with F. You are calling that a betrayal, it's more what I'd
> call a "stand-aside," i.e., allowing a compromise result. It's voting
> Approval-Style.
>
> But there is a risk to the strategy. Sitting with election results, you
> can say, well, if I'd have done this, I'd have had a better result. But, in
> fact, I did not get a bad result, and the public obviously more preferred B
> than F. I might have guessed wrong, but that's always the case, i.e.,
> outcomes are not certain, and we can always look back and find ways we
> could have acted to improve things, and we can also find things we did, in
> which we made investments, that were a waste.
> Most people, I'll content, don't make it all this complicated. Bucklin ER
> allows them to equal rank. That is, in my view, and improvement over *not
> allowing them to equal rank.* Most people, I'll contend, won't use it even
> if there are rare circumstances where it could improve the outcome.
>
> What I saw in my study of Approval vs. Range style voting was that, sure,
> one could look back and think that the result might have been improved by,
> say, a bullet vote. But the harm to the result from voting intermediate
> rating was never full-harm, it was only half-harm. Bullet voting can result
> in full regret. The vote was wasted, when it might have prevented a
> maximally bad outcome.
>
> The situation you are postulating is one where there is a candidate you
> really don't like, who is reasonably likely to get a majority. That's a
> very difficult situation! If this is truly important to you, you have a
> great strategy: approve every candidate but Bad Guy in first rank. The most
> effective thing you can do. However, you probably have some idea of who the
> real candidates are.
>
> Just remember, the "problem scenario" is one where you think Bad Guy may
> get a majority, in the first round of a Bucklin runoff system. Bad Guy
> would have to be really popular to get that result. You are trying to swim
> upstream. It's probably too late.
>
> In fact, when serious Bad Guys get into runoffs, voters turn out in
> droves, the runoff turnout can easily exceed the voting in the primary.
>
>
>
>  You continued:
>>
>> But if I really fear this, I can vote for B in first place in
>> addition to F. That's not burying, that is normal Approval/Range
>> strategy. It's equal ranking, not preference reversal.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> ...and there's no assurance that it will keep A from winning. Maybe A
>> _needs_ those votes that those other voters will give to hir if you
>> don't give F a majority.
>>
>
> Eh? There is never any assurance of anything. What are you talking about,
> Mike. I'm not getting it. How the other voters vote is not dependent on how
> I vote. You must be thinking of votes already cast. But this doesn't make
> sense. If I give F a majority with my vote, the election is either over, or
> there is a multiple majority (which may have implications for a runoff, it
> depends on details.)
>
> Suppose this leads to a runoff between F and A, the Bad Guy. If you feat
> that A will win this election, you are fearing an outcome that is desirable
> socially. You are in trouble. If you are serious, work hard in the
> campaign, because that is where you can be much more effective than with
> your single vote, which really doesn't count for much, usually.
>
>
>
>  You continued:
>>
>> The optimal number of ranks in a Bucklin ballot would be such that
>> nearly all voters bullet vote in the first rank.
>>
>
>
>  Nonsense. If there are unacceptable candidates who could win, your best
>> strategy is to rank all the acceptables in 1st place, and to not rank
>> anyone
>> else.
>>
>
> Mike, I'm disappointed, I'd expect better from you. This is a common
> assertion about Approval strategy. It's way overgeneralized. While you are
> technically correct, with proper specification of conditions, it's
> misleading.
>
> The conditions for what you have said to be correct: the "unacceptable
> candidates" are truly Bad. Like genocidally bad. Or, at least, that they
> are so bad that you don't care about who among the other candidates wins,
> you will be *so* relieved that one of the Bad Guys did not win.
> But what you are fearing here is that a majority of the electorate is
> ready to approve one or more of the Bad Guys. You don't trust the
> electorate, a difficult position to be fixed in. Perhaps you should buy a
> ticket out of the country for the day when the results of the election will
> be known, before the black helicopters can be sent. Cast your vote and tie
> your camel. Seriously, remember, a contested Bucklin election with more
> than two viable candidates will almost never complete in the first round,
> for obvious reasons. It is *highly unlikely*, in most scenarios, that you
> would *reasonably fear* that Bad Guy would win in the first round, unless
> your position is really no-hope. Obama is your Bad Guy.
>
>
>  Further, even if it isn't a u/a election, in my posting about
>> voting-options in Approval elections, I said that the
>> seeming (often) suboptimality of the ABucklin option in an Approval
>> election
>> suggests that voting only at 1st rank is often the best ABucklin strategy,
>> even if it isn't an unacceptables/acceptables election. You might not
>> agree with
>> that conclusion. I admit that it's only a subjective impression.
>>
>
> I don't really know the name ABucklin, so I'm assuming that what you wrote
> applies to simple Bucklin-ER. The traditional three-rank Bucklin method,
> but with overvotes allowed in first rank. Perhaps ABucklin means Approval
> Bucklin. Traditional Bucklin was Approval in all ranks but the first.
> Traditions die hard. They really wanted to get those Favorite votes. Makes
> the method uncontestably Majority Criterion compliant.
>
> But at the cost of collecting garbage information, indicating strong
> preference when the preference might be weak or a coin toss.
>
> If allowin that overvote allows voters, in some circumstances, to improve
> outcomes by equal ranking a candidate with their favorite, I see absolutely
> *no harm* in that. They are either correct, or they are stupid. In any
> case, they act as they decide, and making a compromise is not a bad thing,
> in itself. And that is all they are doing. They are accepting, in the
> scenario above, b, because they prefer B to A.
>
> But I think that very few voters will do this unless there is a really
> unusual situation, an election with three viable candidates *and* a
> reasonable possibility of the worst one winning in the first round. 3
> viable candidates, and one, A, is in range of getting over 50%
> first-preference votes? That must mean that the other two are *together* at
> 50% or less. If one of them is at 30%, the other is at 20%. We don't know
> about second-preference, but presumably polls would be available.
>
> What kind of election is this? If it is nonpartisan, it is *highly
> unlikely*, with those first preference numbers, that anyone else could win
> this election but A.
>
> Now, what could demolish this analysis is a lot of voters who prefer A
> second, but who add votes for A in the first round. But why would they do
> that? These voters, if they vote that way, must think that their favorite
> can't win, and they must strongly dislike the runner-up.
>
> No, almost all voters, in Bucklin, even if allowed to overvote, will not.
> Exceptions would be strong supporters of no-hope candidates who don't want
> to waste *any* voting power. By definition, this will be very few -- or the
> candidate would not be "no-hope."
>
> Runoffs will depress additional approvals in the primary. I know that Mike
> will point to turkey-raising strategy, I'll look at that later. As it
> applies to Bucklin, turkey-raising strategy would probably be sincere, in a
> way. Whether or not this is viable at all may depend on rule details, and
> most importantly, the common assumption that if it is runoff, it must be
> some kind of top-two runoff, is just that, an assumption. We will look,
> eventually, at the evolution of the Voting System of the Future, and my own
> personal question is when we will get wise to Asset, which makes complex
> voting systems *obsolete,* Range polls plus efficient deliberative process
> blows them all away.
>
>
>
>  You continlued:
>>
>> When there are more than two viable candidates, I'd expect majority
>> failure to occur in the first rank, routinely. The scenario presented
>> won't occur, at all
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Wrong. Of course it could. If you want to actually _demostrate_ that it
>> won't often happen, then I invite you to do so.
>>
>
> Demonstrate that it will happen, if you want to raise this bete noir. I'll
> warn you, I'll want to see some realistic utility profiles. Many "nightmare
> scenarios" involve preposterous profiles, or something that *sounds bad*
> but if you look at Bayesian regret, it is either an improvement, not a
> harm, or it's relatively harmless.
>
>
>
>  But of course it could happen.
>>
>> You continued:
>>
>> , so a voter worrying about it is worrying about
>> something quite unlikely.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> As I've said, I've watched someone favorite-bury in a Condorcet-counted
>> rank-balloting election. If you can't firmly assure voters that they can't
>> possibly benefit from favorite-burial, then timid overcompromisers are
>> going
>> to favorite-bury.
>>
>
> Favorite burial is a rational strategy with many voting systems. Equal
> ranking amost always makes it unnecessary to acdtually "bury."
>
> Mike, you have this idea of elections ruined, right and left, by "timid
> overcompromisers." People compromise because they don't see it as a high
> cost. "Timid" is your projection. If they care a great deal, strong
> preference, they won't compromise so easily. That's all. What, exactly, is
> the problem with  "timid overcompromisers"? What is "overcompromising"?
> Each voter sees benefits and risks. If they see the risk of failing to
> compromise as greater than the benefit of refusing to compromise, they will
> compromise. It indicates preference strength. It works.
> I would guess that you would define "overcompromising" as compromising
> when you might be able to get a personally improved benefit by refusing to
> compromise. But missing from this analysis is the *amount* of the benefit.
> If it is small, there is little damage to social utility, if any. It might
> be an improvement.
>
>
>
>  (The below-quoted question has been answered: ABucklin can't fail FBC)
>>
>> >Does anyone know if there's actually a proof that ER-Bucklin meets FBC?
>>
>> You answered:
>>
>> It's an Approval method, so this depends on how you define "Favorite
>> Betrayal." If equal ranking is betrayal, yes. But that's weird.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Favorite-betrayal is favorite-burial. Voting someone over your favorite.
>>
>
> Is equal ranking the favorite with someone less preferred,
> "favorite-betrayal"?
>
> However, Mike, you should know that I place little weight in most voting
> system criteria, as absolutes. I define an ideal voting system as one that
> efficiently finds maximized absolute utility (which can probably only be
> known in simulations). An ideal system *must violate* certain criteria as
> applied to single-ballot systems. Few of the criteria have been carefully
> applied to repeated ballot systems, except with unrealistic -- or just
> plain false -- assumptions.
>
> Failing FBC is not necessarily a problem. Obviously, it's, in itself,
> undesirable. Whether it's a problem or not depends on the effect on SU
> maximization. *How much of a problem*?
>
>
>
>  And no, not all Approval-related methods pass FBC. For instance,
>> Stepwise-to-Majority and Stepwise-When-Needed fail FBC.
>>
>> Those are stepwise Approval methods.
>>
>
> Mike, you know a great deal more than I about the details of many
> different systems. You were discussing and working on these issues when I
> was only working on delegable proxy, and knew little about the great
> variety of polling systems.
>
>
>  >Can it be shown that the verbal FBC-Failure scenario described above
>> >couldn't really happen?
>> >
>> >Might ABucklin fail FBC?
>>
>> You continue:
>>
>> I don't see how what you described is Favorite Betrayal
>>
>> Voting someone over your favorite is what I mean by favorite betrayal
>> or favorite-burial.
>>
>
> Fine. So equal ranking does not cause failure. Approval passes. Bucklin
> passes. We may then look at Bucklin/runoff.
>
> The benefits of runoff are not only from raw SU optimization, but the
> *process* brings focused collective intelligence to bear on the election
> problem. That second campaign matters, and the differential turnout
> matters. Little of this has been carefully considered, though Robert's
> Rules is quite aware of the benefits of repeated ballot, i.e., voters are
> now informed by the results of the earlier round, and will make more
> informed choices.
>
>
>
>  (I don't capitalize it, except as part of the name of the Favorite
>> Betrayal Criterion)
>>
>> You continued:
>>
>> , but I
>> probably don't realize details of the method you are considering.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> 1. I'm no longer considering Stepwise-to-Majority
>> 2. I posted all of its details.
>>
>> I'd be glad to answer any questions about what I meant when I defined it,
>> but remember that I don't propose it, due to its FBC failure.
>>
>
> I don't know what Stepwise-to-Majority is, specifically, but Bucklin
> certainly looks like that name. Range/Bucklin, i.e., a Range ballot
> analyzed stepwise per Bucklin, could use that name.
> Once we are getting sophisticated with the canvassing method, however,
> there are many tests that can be applied to a ballot. Once there is a
> runoff possibility, there can be Condorcet Criterion satisfaction, for
> example, due to the runoff behavior. There are a host of details that can
> make the difference. Are write-ins allowed? If so, there aren't actually
> any eliminations, there might just be ballot position. It's possible that a
> runoff has more than two candidates on the ballot, if an advanced system is
> used in the runoff. Etc.
>
> Getting a majority is desirable. It's essential in direct process, but we
> are talking about compromised public process. Some jurisdictions do allow a
> write-in in the runoff, and that is clearly more "democratic." (Robert's
> Rules standard secret-ballot elections use blank pieces of paper. Voters
> can vote for anyone eligible for the office.) Write-ins can and have won.
> But my real point here is that by using an advanced method that is
> relatively spoiler-proof, bullet voting may cause failure to reach a
> majority, but there is no need to bullet vote, say, with a Bucklin runoff.
> You can vote for your favorite (who might be write-in) in first rank. You
> are then free to vote for a frontrunner. If you have strong preference, you
> might vote for a frontrunner in third place, leaving the second rank blank.
> Or you might vote for a frontrunner not at all. It's up to you, and there
> is no single strategy that optimizes the outcome for you in all situations,
> but the method, properly done, will amalgamate sincere preferences properly.
>
> Bottom line, the search for the Holy Grail of voting systems is probably
> looking for something that does not exist. But we can get quite close.
> Let's suppose we have an ideal system. Fine. Be sure to use it for the
> final round in a runoff system that will guarantee that an "ideal winner"
> will get into the runoff. The voters will have a vastly improved level of
> information about the overall position of the electorate.
>
> Just remember, in any decision-making system, utilities will be combined
> with probability information. The latter is the basis of what is called
> "strategic voting." It is inevitable.
>
>
>
>
>  You continued:
>>
>> I
>> haven't been reading the list, but "Stepwise Bucklin"
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> All Bucklin is stepwise. Bucklin is a stepwise Approval.
>>
>
> Right. Bucklin can use a Range ballot, stepping down through the ratings,
> seeking majority approval. If the ballot has an explicit approval cutoff,
> with the meaning being as I've described (i.e., majority approval is
> required for election in a primary, or else the natural consequence is a
> runoff, a nuisance for most voters), then it really can find that majority,
> if it exists.
>
> This is not necessarily ideal, but it's not been simulated, to my
> knowledge. Runoff simulations have assumed that the voters are the same in
> the first round and in the runoff, which is totally unrealistic. A more
> sophisticated simulation will start with a voting population and an
> algorithm to determine who votes, i.e., the probability that the voter
> cares enough to vote. What has been missed by many is that turnout is a
> factor that incorporates *absolute range data* into the process.
>
>
>   Not the only one, but the
>> only kind I know of that passes FBC. I propose the method described in
>> the electowiki
>> as "ER-Bucklin". I call it ABucklin.
>>
>
> Yeah, by the end of this reply, I'd figured that out.
> Raw Bucklin, I do not see as ideal. Just damn good. Far better than
> UnFairVote would have us think. UnFairVote has been going around killing
> Top Two Runoff, the most widely adopted voting system reform, which is much
> better than IRV, in terms of performance. Sure, it can be more costly. But
> that is fairly easy to fix, and it's amazing to me that this was apparently
> never done.
>
> Bucklin was, like IRV, oversold as a method of finding majorities in
> multi-candidate elections. It often succeeded, and they were genuine
> majorities, unlike the faux majority that IRV promises. But it could fail
> and, later, under party primary conditions, did fail.
>
> Because of this, those states went to Top Two Runoff. Which is vulnerable
> to Center Squeeze, and which can have higher cost.
>
> So use a runoff system with a Bucklin primary, at least. Still not ideal,
> but a tremendous step forward. The two most widely-implemented election
> reforms in the U.S., combined as a hybrid.
>
> But it all starts with Count All the Votes.
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
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