# [EM] Jameson: Sure, I basically agree about conditional methods

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Tue Mar 20 10:01:10 PDT 2012

Jameson:

You wrote:

The basic chicken dilemma is:
35 A>B
25 B>A
40 C

This is, indeed, resolved by AOC. But what about:
39 A
39 B
22 C

If C voters AOC-approve A and B, then A and B are in a chicken-like
position. Whichever one of them gives C more AOC approvals will win; but if
they both give 20 or more, then C wins.

[endquote]

Something similar could happen in the ABE that I've been using too
(the 27,24,49 example), as you pointed out later in your posting.

You continued:

I think that C winning in the normal chicken dilemma is at least a bit
justifiable. C winning in this upside-down scenario is totally wrong.

[endquote]

Ok, it gets ridiculous, doesn't it. And complicated. But that's what
I consider an _advantage_ of the conditional methods. The chicken dilemma,
in ordinary Approval (and other non-defection-resistant methods) I refer to
as the primary C/D problem. The chicken dilemma that remains in the defection
resistant methods, when people continue to defect, in the new situation, I refer
to as a secondary C/D problem.

Secondary C/D problems are so ridiculous and complicated that I don't think that
people will be likely to vote in that way.

Approval's primary C/D problem only requires the natural and instinctive strategy
of not assisting a rival. That will likely happen. The secondary C/D problem of AOC,
and the other conditional methods, requires voting that is so ridiculous, complicated,
counter-intuitive and unnatural, that it will happen a lot less.

So, that's why I say that the conditional methods complicate and alleviate the C/D problem.
Ridiculous defection strategies? Sure. Complicated defection strategies? Sure. Less appealing
defection strategies too.

I readily admit that I, too, don't like the ridiculous and complicated nature of
that secondary C/D problem. But it might be better than the primary C/D problem.

...or maybe not. After all, in a posting a few days ago, I listed five ways that
Approval's primary C/D problem can be dealt with in Approval. So it isn't a hopeless
irremediable problem. I don't know if any such solutions exist for AOC's secondary
C/D problem.

So, it may well be better to stick with plain ordinary Approval and ABucklin (and MTA & MTA),
and their solvable primary C/D problem.

Thanks for the persistance that brought the secondary C/D problem to my attention.

I'm inclined now to just prefer ordinary Approval. Maybe ABucklin &/or MTA or MCA as
options in the Approval election. Especially if people demand more than ordinary Approval.
Speaking for myself, I'd be content if the method were ordinary Approval, without the
other voting options. I'd also have no objection to the options either.

Certainly ordinary Approval should be the first proposal. And if options are not
later added to it, and ordinary Approval remains the method in use, that would be fine.

Mike Ossipoff

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