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<pre><br>Jameson:<br><br>You wrote:<br><br>The basic chicken dilemma is:
35 A>B
25 B>A
40 C
This is, indeed, resolved by AOC. But what about:
39 A
39 B
22 C
If C voters AOC-approve A and B, then A and B are in a chicken-like
position. Whichever one of them gives C more AOC approvals will win; but if
they both give 20 or more, then C wins.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Something similar could happen in the ABE that I've been using too <br>(the 27,24,49 example), as you pointed out later in your posting.<br><br>You continued:<br><br>I think that C winning in the normal chicken dilemma is at least a bit
justifiable. C winning in this upside-down scenario is totally wrong.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Ok, it gets ridiculous, doesn't it. And complicated. But that's what<br>I consider an _advantage_ of the conditional methods. The chicken dilemma,<br>in ordinary Approval (and other non-defection-resistant methods) I refer to<br>as the primary C/D problem. The chicken dilemma that remains in the defection<br>resistant methods, when people continue to defect, in the new situation, I refer<br>to as a secondary C/D problem.<br><br>Secondary C/D problems are so ridiculous and complicated that I don't think that<br>people will be likely to vote in that way.<br><br>Approval's primary C/D problem only requires the natural and instinctive strategy<br>of not assisting a rival. That will likely happen. The secondary C/D problem of AOC,<br>and the other conditional methods, requires voting that is so ridiculous, complicated,<br>counter-intuitive and unnatural, that it will happen a lot less.<br><br>So, that's why I say that the conditional methods complicate and alleviate the C/D problem.<br>Ridiculous defection strategies? Sure. Complicated defection strategies? Sure. Less appealing<br>defection strategies too.<br><br>I readily admit that I, too, don't like the ridiculous and complicated nature of<br>that secondary C/D problem. But it might be better than the primary C/D problem.<br><br>...or maybe not. After all, in a posting a few days ago, I listed five ways that<br>Approval's primary C/D problem can be dealt with in Approval. So it isn't a hopeless<br>irremediable problem. I don't know if any such solutions exist for AOC's secondary<br>C/D problem.<br><br>So, it may well be better to stick with plain ordinary Approval and ABucklin (and MTA & MTA),<br>and their solvable primary C/D problem.<br><br>Thanks for the persistance that brought the secondary C/D problem to my attention. <br><br>I'm inclined now to just prefer ordinary Approval. Maybe ABucklin &/or MTA or MCA as<br>options in the Approval election. Especially if people demand more than ordinary Approval.<br>Speaking for myself, I'd be content if the method were ordinary Approval, without the<br>other voting options. I'd also have no objection to the options either.<br><br>Certainly ordinary Approval should be the first proposal. And if options are not <br>later added to it, and ordinary Approval remains the method in use, that would be fine.<br><br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br>
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