[EM] AOC and upside-down chickens

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Wed Mar 14 14:40:39 PDT 2012

The basic chicken dilemma is:
35 A>B
25 B>A
40 C

This is, indeed, resolved by AOC. But what about:
39 A
39 B
22 C

If C voters AOC-approve A and B, then A and B are in a chicken-like
position. Whichever one of them gives C more AOC approvals will win; but if
they both give 20 or more, then C wins.

I think that C winning in the normal chicken dilemma is at least a bit
justifiable. C winning in this upside-down scenario is totally wrong.

(In fact, you can have the same problem with A and B trying to free-ride on
C with AOC in the standard chicken dilemma; but I doubt anti-C voters would
be that sneaky.)

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