[EM] Declaration's policy on single-mark ballots (was Re: Do any of you have any thoughts about California's top-two primary?)

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/6/10 Steve Eppley <SEppley at alumni.caltech.edu>

> It's a bad idea for the Declaration to denounce all single-mark ballot
> methods,


But it doesn't. Also, I think we should start calling it the DEMRA.


> because one of them--Vote for a Published Ranking (VPR)--has desirable
> properties that distinguish it from the others. (One can also make an
> argument that VPR is better than many voting methods that require more
> complicated ballots.)
>
>     VPR:
>     Two weeks before election day, each candidate publishes a
> top-to-bottom ordering
>     of all the candidates. (Any candidate who fails to meet the deadline
> will be treated
>     as if s/he'd ranked him/herself on top and all others tied for bottom.)
>
>     On election day, each voter simply selects one candidate.


>     Then each vote is treated as if it were the ordering published by its
> selected
>     candidate.  These orderings are tallied by a good preference order
> algorithm
>     to determine the winner.
>


This is very similar to SODA. It is simpler to explain (though not as much
as you might think, because you still have to explain the underlying ranked
system used), but I think worse in several regards. Still, I'd agree that
it is a very good method overall.


> Some interesting variations:
> 1. Give each candidate the opportunity to withdraw after the vote totals
> are published; withdrawn candidates will be dropped to the bottom of each
> ordering before the orderings are tallied.  With this option, tallying
> algorithms such as plurality rule & instant runoff would become nearly as
> good as condorcet algorithms because withdrawal would mitigate their
> vote-splitting problem. (Borda would still be terrible due to its clones
> problem.)  Also, withdrawal would be useful in presidential elections--with
> VPR and other voting methods--to help candidates avoid fragmenting the
> Electoral College.
>

SODA effectively allows withdrawal in its default form.


> 2. Technology permitting, allow each voter to select an ordering published
> by a candidate or by a non-government organization (NGO).  Some example
> NGOs: the New York Times, the Sierra Club, the National Rifle Association...
>

Pretty soon, you'd have all permutations available, and it becomes just
equivalent to the underlying method. Perhaps a bit simpler for a trusting
voter, a bit more complicated for a non-trusting voter.


> 3. Technology permitting, let each voter modify the ordering published by
> her selected candidate, before submitting it as her vote.
>

Ouch. Suddenly the ballot design is a nightmare. Don't like this one at all.


>
> Obviously, being a "single-mark" method, VPR maximizes simplicity.


No, SODA is simpler for voters. You can unintentionally spoil your ballot
in VPR, but not in SODA.


>  Yet it can be expected to handle the vote-splitting problem well.


Assuming the candidates are honest, yes. However, I think I see ways that
rational candidate strategy could still give pathological results, in
situations that SODA handles well.


>  It ought to typically allow each voter to vote for her sincere favorite,
> assuming her favorite publishes an ordering the voter considers reasonable.
> (Or strategically reasonable.  If an election has a strategy problem, the
> voter's favorite can handle it by publishing a strategic ordering, or by
> withdrawing if necessary, if withdrawal is an option.)
>

Similar to SODA in this regard, and yes, this is an important strength.


>
> Also, VPR would make it easier for good candidates to win without spending
> a lot of money, since they can win by persuading other candidates to rank
> them over worse candidates.


As with SODA in this sense, though SODA has a failsafe so that if this kind
of thing leads to a total "surprise" winner, perhaps because of dishonest
strategy, at least one other candidate will be able to back out, letting
their stronger opponent win instead of the dark horse they'd said they
preferred (perhaps without proper vetting).


>  For example, Centrist might persuade Left to rank Centrist over Right,
> and Right to rank Centrist over Left.  Furthermore, an honest centrist
> might persuade Left & Right to rank her over corrupt centrists, and when
> she can't due to Left & Right also being corrupt, the corrupt orderings
> they publish would presumably attract negative attention during the two
> weeks preceding the election, reducing their votes.
>

Again, I think this is a very good method; I just think that SODA is better.

Jameson

>
> Regards,
> Steve Eppley
> ---------------
> On 6/8/2012 2:20 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
>
>> Although this is a bit of a simplification, the "top-two" runoff form of
>> voting in the U.S. consists of using single-mark ballots combined with a
>> variation of instant-runoff voting.
>>
> -snip-
>
>> The way this fits into the "Declaration of Election-Method Reform
>> Advocates" is that the Declaration denounces single-mark ballots,
>> regardless of how they are counted.
>>
> -snip-
>
>> I think the easiest way to explain the concept is in the context of vote
>> splitting,
>>
> Richard Fobes
>
>> > On 6/7/2012 8:31 AM, Adrian Tawfik wrote:
>>
> -snip-
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20120610/b22392ca/attachment-0004.htm>