[EM] Throwing my hat into the ring, possibly to get trampled

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 06/09/2012 12:27 AM, Nicholas Buckner wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I am Nicholas Buckner. I developed an alternative method that takes
> the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives path over the Condorcet
> path. It handles single-winner elections and multiple-winner
> elections. I believe it satisfies a great number of criterions,
> including difficult ones like Clone Independence and Participation.

I don't think this passes IIA.

Consider the following CSV:

25,1,2,3
40,2,3,1
35,3,1,2

i.e. 25 A>B>C, 40 B>C>A, 35 C>A>B.

According to your program, the ordering is {0,2} > 3 > 1 or B > C > A, 
so B wins.

So let's remove irrelevant candidate C (3):

25,1,2
40,2,1
35,1,2

Now the ordering is {0,1} > 2 or A > B, as enforced by the Majority 
criterion.

So eliminating irrelevant candidate C shifted the win from B to A.

The example above is engineered so that no matter who you pick in the 
three-candidate election, one can remove an irrelevant alternative and 
force someone else to win by the majority criterion.