[EM] MAMD (Max Assent Min Dissent)
jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Tue Jan 3 07:56:39 PST 2012
2012/1/2 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
> Mike wrote ..
> > > MMPO with symmetric completion at bottom, while avoiding Kevin's
> > > bad-example, also sometimes loses
> > > MMPO's ABE-success:
> > >
> > > 60: A>B
> > > 55: B
> > > 100: C
> Forest replied
> > Here is the pairwise opposition matrix for MAMD:
> > [[155, 110, 87.5],
> > [105, 100, 115],
> > [127.5, 100, 115]] .
> > The max dissent against B is from the 110 A supporters. This is
> > the minimum of
> > the max dissents, since A has is disapproved by 155, and B has a
> > complaint of
> > 115 against C , not to mention the 115 disapproval against C.
> > So yes, B wins.
> Of course, if the A faction knows that the B faction sincere order is
> B>A>C, the 60 A>B voters can split
> up to give
> 15 A
> 45 A>B
> Then if the B voters stubbornly bullet, C will win.
> But if as many (45) of them vote sincerely as the A voters, then A will
> I think this is a pretty good resolution of the defection problem.
I've certainly seen worse. But it requires some sophistication from some
voters, and some good polling data. In the limit, it requires
unrealistically-high levels of both. So I still say that SODA's resolution
of the defection problem is clearly the best such resolution I know of.
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