[EM] Which matters more: Getting/Figuring Out the Best Single-Winner Rule or Incorporating More Multi-Winner Rules ASAP in the US?

[David L Wetzell]

is the relevant question and nested within it is whether or not the US's
two-party dominated system can be saved without pushing for a more EU-style
multi-party system.
Cuz, even if X_EU >> X_2partystatusquo that does not mean X_EU*p_EU>
X_2partyplus*P_2partyplus, whereas X_2partyplus is at least >
X_2partystatusquo.

This is at the heart over whether or not an approval-voting enhanced IRV,
or IRV+ is suitable as an initial consensus single-winner rule to pave the
way for more innovations and experimentation later.  Unlike with Approval
Voting, IRV+ tends to support a 2partyplus system which is part of the
reason why in the short-run at least P_IRV+>>P_Approval.

A similar arg can be given for American forms of PR that also tend to
support a 2partyplus system.

I've argued here that your many args over the Xs are less important than
the Ps.  One of the key args for this has been that given the specificity
of the status quo system in the US, it seems the number of serious
candidates is held down in our single-winner elections, or almost all of
our elections and fewer serious candidates inevitably reduces the Xs among
single-winner election rules.  I'd add that the inability of this listserve
to come upon a favorite alternative to any brand of IRV indicates that Xs
are also fuzzier than short-run Ps.  The clear-cut nature of short-run Ps
make it a natural basis for rallying sincere electoral reformers, which
will in turn tend to bolster the Ps of the pragmatically chosen initial
main alternatives to FPTP for the US.

dlw
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