[EM] suggested improvement on Mutual Majority criterion/set (and MTA reviewd)

[C.Benham]

On 21 Dec 2011 I proposed this criterion:

> *The winner must come from the smallest set S of candidates about which
> the following is true: the number of ballots on which all the members
> (or sole member) is voted strictly above all the non-member candidates
> is greater than the number of ballots on which a (any)   non-member
> candidate is voted strictly above all the members of S.*


That is fairly clear, but the wording could perhaps be improved, say:

*If the number of ballots on which some set S of candidates is  voted 
strictly above all the candidates outside S is greater than the number 
of ballots on which all the members of  S are voted below equal-top
(i.e. strictly below some/any outside-S candidate), then the winner must 
come from S.*

I tentatively suggested the name "Add-Top Proofed Solid Coalition 
Majority".   A bit less clumsy would be "Add-Top Proofed Mutual 
Majority". Maybe there is a better name that either does without the 
word "Majority" or includes another word that qualifies it.  For the 
time being I'll stick with Add-Top Proofed Mutual Majority (ATPMM)



I gave this example:

45: A>B
20: A=B
32: B
03: D

My criterion says that the winner must be A, but Mike Ossipoff's MTA 
method elects B.

I did endorse MTA as an improvement on MCA, but since it (and not MCA) 
fails this (what I consider to be very important) criterion (and is also 
a bit more complicated than MCA) I now withdraw
that endorsement.  I still acknowledge that MTA may be a bit more 
"strategically comfortable" for voters, but I can't give that factor 
enough weight to make MTA acceptable or win its comparison with MCA.

Chris Benham