[EM] The oldest bad-example trick in the book

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Wed Feb 29 18:33:14 PST 2012

Hi Mike,

Personally I don't think anyone is "wronged" in the MMPO example.
I just don't think voters would accept it, and it would be difficult
to advocate. People will ask how the outcome can possibly make sense
and I don't think you can reassure them by asking who's wronged.

The issue isn't really "favoriteness" but the near lack of any votes
at all. Most people expect winning candidates to have their own
positive support, not just lack of opposition.

That said, the voters could see themselves as wronged if they felt
it was strategically advisable under the method to truncate. You
suggest that if the A voters really preferred B (the other big
candidate) to C (tiny candidate) then they should have voted for A
and B? I for one can't see myself doing that. The apparent front-
runners are A and B and I wouldn't vote for the worse frontrunner 
under MMPO. It makes more sense to try to deter burial attempts than
to defend against an extremely unlikely C victory.
But I don't want to discourage you from supporting MMPO. The first 
method I ever invented was in effect MMPO on approval ballots. I 
have a soft spot for this mechanic.

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list