[EM] élection de trois élection de trois
robert bristow-johnson
rbj at audioimagination.com
Sun Feb 19 18:13:51 PST 2012
On 2/19/12 8:53 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> It seems quite a few election rules get quirky in one way or the other
> with a 3-way competitive election.
>
> That might be a point worth considering in the abstract in a paper or
> something.... why are 3-way single-winner elections quirky?
>
isn't it obvious?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duverger%27s_law
to wit: Duverger suggests two reasons why single-member district
plurality voting systems favor a two party system. One is the result of
the "fusion" (or an alliance very like fusion) of the weak parties, and
the other is the "elimination" of weak parties by the voters, by which
he means that the voters gradually desert the weak parties on the
grounds that they have no chance of winning.
> On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 5:31 PM, Jameson Quinn
> <jameson.quinn at gmail.com <mailto:jameson.quinn at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> ..., cuz the simple fact of the matter is that IRV works best
> with only 3 candidates.
>
>
geez, i wish people used only plain text email. or that the list server
converted every post to plain text, perhaps wrapping lines at 70 columns.
> 2.5, actually.
>
yeah, i don't get the reasoning behind David's claim. IRV works just as
well with 4 or more candidates as with 3. if there are 3 nearly equal
candidates IRV may screw up just as bad as if there are 3 nearly equal
candidates with more minor candidates added. i am not assuming "IRV3".
--
r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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