[EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?

[David L Wetzell]

From: Richard Fobes <ElectionMethods at VoteFair.org>
> To: election-methods at electorama.com
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 12:01:16 -0800
> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
> On 2/17/2012 6:49 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
>
>> ...
>> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked
>> choices or party-list PR.  ...
>>
>> So what do you think?
>>
>
> I don't see this as an either/or choice,


dlw: U2 apparently are not among most folks...


> nor do I see a viable "both" option being suggested.
>

dlw: viability is a low-blow at this stage, but I guess it's a blow I use
quite often.

>
> So I'll again suggest VoteFair ranking:
>
> VoteFair ranking uses "ranked choices" (1-2-3 ballots and pairwise
> counting...) for identifying the most popular candidate -- for filling the
> first seat in a legislative district.
>
> VoteFair ranking fills the second district-based seat with the
> "second-most representative" candidate.  In the U.S., even without asking
> voters to indicate a party preference, that would usually be the most
> popular candidate from the opposite party (i.e. the opposite party compared
> to the first-seat winner).
>
> To further increase proportionality, VoteFair ranking fills some
> proportional seats based on the favorite party of the voters. (Whichever
> party has the biggest gap between voter proportion and filled-seat
> proportion wins the next seat.)
>
> We don't have to choose between proportionality (PR) and ranked methods.
>  We can get both.  And in a U.S.-compatible way.
>
> If election-method reform is to happen in the U.S., it has to merge with
> the reality of the two-party system.  And I believe it should accommodate
> third parties only to the extent that voters are unable to regain control
> of the two main parties.
>

dlw: I agree with the reality of the 2-party system.  I also believe that
we need to make the case that our 2-party system will work much, much
better if we give 3rd parties a constructive role to play in it.  Giving
them access to one-third of the seats in the state assembly so they get to
determine which major party is in power in that body every two years is
such a constructive role.  It will give folks more exit threat from the two
major parties, thereby making both of them more responsive to the moving
center.

>
> As for STV, going beyond two seats easily produces unfair results.  And in
> the U.S. the results also would be quite unstable (i.e. not mesh well with
> the current two-party system).
>

Can you elaborate?
I don't see why 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota wouldn't have results like
what you described that would maintain yet transform the US's 2-party
system.

dlw

>
> Richard Fobes
>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> To: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
> Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 14:35:58 -0600
> Subject: Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA
> If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with
> plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true.
>
> Jameson
>
> 2012/2/17 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>
>> IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to
>> convince someone like Soros to help you market it.  It wouldn't matter if
>> you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory.
>>
>> But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many
>> serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over
>> IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more
>> significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight
>> modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first
>> stage.
>>
>> dlw
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, <
>> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>>
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>>> Today's Topics:
>>>
>>>   1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma?
>>>      (Kristofer Munsterhjelm)
>>>   2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell)
>>>   3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn)
>>>   4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn)
>>>   5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour)
>>>   6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze)
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>
>>> To: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>>> Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma?
>>> On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>>
>>>> As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken
>>>> dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma.
>>>> Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either
>>>> plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would
>>>> have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two
>>>> "vote splitting" factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred
>>>> each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood
>>>> and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to
>>>> cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000
>>>> doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not
>>>> have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the
>>>> most self-consistent counts of Florida.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was
>>> used to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the property
>>> would remain in a singlewinner context.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>>> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>>> Cc:
>>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600
>>> Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
>>> It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets
>>> used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections.
>>>
>>> Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas.
>>>  STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US.  I'm not
>>> complaining because it's good to simplify things.  But if STV were bundled
>>> with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd
>>> parties get a constructive role to play in US politics.
>>>
>>> So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a
>>> first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring
>>> process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and
>>> 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections.  The latter
>>> two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter
>>> attention.  Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates
>>> in an election where they often simply vote their party line?  Why not keep
>>> it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the
>>> system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested?
>>>
>>> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked
>>> choices or party-list PR.  I think it is a matter of context and that both
>>> can be useful, especially when no explicit party-list is required for a
>>> 3-seat LR Hare election.  The vice-candidates who would hold the extra
>>> seats a party wins could either be selected after the victory or specified
>>> before hand.
>>>
>>> So what do you think?
>>>
>>> I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those in power
>>> aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and I'm not sure they're
>>> wrong about that, plus the US is used to voting the candidate and having
>>> their representative and they could keep that if there are relatively few
>>> seats per election.
>>>
>>> dlw
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>>> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>,
>>> electionsciencefoundation <electionscience at googlegroups.com>
>>> Cc:
>>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:20:20 -0600
>>> Subject: [EM] SODA arguments
>>> For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all
>>> measure of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic voters
>>> will beat all other systems, including Range/Approval.
>>>
>>> For those who feel that Condorcet compliance is the be-all-and-end-all,
>>> a majority Condorcet winner, or any Condorcet winner with 3 candidates and
>>> full candidate preferences, is not just the winner with honest votes, but
>>> in all cases the strategically-forced winner; this contrasts with Condorcet
>>> systems, in which strategy can cause even majority- or 3-candidate- CWs to
>>> lose.
>>>
>>> For those who feel that strategic resistance is the most important, SODA
>>> is unmatched. It meets FBC, solves the chicken dilemma, has no burial
>>> incentive (ie, meets later-no-help), and even meets later-no-harm for the
>>> two most-approved candidates (where it matters most). It's monotonic, and I
>>> believe (haven't proven) that it meets consistency. It meets participation,
>>> cloneproofness, and IIA for up to 4 candidates.
>>>
>>> For those "middlebrows" who most value a system's acceptability to
>>> current incumbents, SODA is top-of-the-line. It allows voters to vote
>>> plurality-style and, if two parties are clearly favored by voters, allows
>>> those two parties to prevent a weak centrist from winning, even if
>>> polarization is so high that the centrist is an apparent Condorcet winner.
>>>
>>> For those who want simplicity: while it's true that the SODA counting
>>> process is more complicated than approval, the process of voting is
>>> actually simpler than any other system, because you can just vote for your
>>> favorite candidate. For the majority who agrees with their favorite
>>> candidate's preferences, there is no strategic need to watch the polls and
>>> figure out who the frontrunners are, and no nail-biting dilemma of whether
>>> to rank others as equal to your favorite.
>>>
>>> And for those who balk at delegation, SODA allows any voter to cast a
>>> direct, undelegated ballot; and allows those voters who do delegate to know
>>> how their vote will be used. Refusing to consider SODA because you don't
>>> want to delegate, is like refusing to walk into a candy store because you
>>> don't like chocolate; SODA allows, not requires, delegation.
>>>
>>> I think pretty much everybody on this list falls into one or more of the
>>> above categories. So, what's not to like about SODA?
>>>
>>> Jameson
>>>
>>> ps. I clarified the SODA procedure<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA_voting_(Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval)#Full.2C_step-by-step_rules> on
>>> the wiki, though there were no substantive changes. I improved the
>>> formatting, marked the steps which are optional, and better explained that
>>> winning candidates use their delegated votes first because precisely
>>> because they will probably choose not to approve others.
>>>
>>> Comments are welcome.
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>>> To: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>>> Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:26:33 -0600
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
>>>
>>>>
>>>> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked
>>>> choices or party-list PR.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't. I think that party-list removes voter freedom, and ranked
>>> choices is too much of a burden on the voter. While either would be better
>>> than what we have, I prefer to use delegation a la SODA.
>>>
>>> Thus my favored system is PAL representation<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation>.
>>> It's true that PAL still has some (very attenuated) party-list-like
>>> aspects, because party affiliation is used to match candidates to districts
>>> at the end; but if you were willing to give up this (overlapping)
>>> geographical representation aspect of PAL, you could make a similar
>>> delegated PR system in which parties played no explicit role.
>>>
>>> Jameson
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: "James Gilmour" <jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk>
>>> To: "'David L Wetzell'" <wetzelld at gmail.com>, "'EM'" <
>>> election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>>> Cc:
>>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 18:01:55 -0000
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
>>> But why would you want all these differences and complications?
>>>
>>> If you are going to use STV-PR for some of these elections, why not use
>>> STV-PR for all of these elections to the various
>>> "representative assemblies" (councils, state legislatures, US House of
>>> Representatives, US Senate).  STV-PR works OK in both
>>> partisan and non-partisan elections, so it should give fair and proper
>>> representation of the VOTERS in all these different
>>> elections.
>>>
>>> Of course, with districts returning only 3 to 5 members, the
>>> proportionality and direct representation MAY be a little limited, but
>>> if small numbers are needed to make the system acceptable to the vested
>>> interests, then so be it.  STV-PR with 3, 4 or 5 member
>>> districts is greatly to be preferred to plurality in single-member
>>> districts and to plurality at large.  We had to accept local
>>> government wards electing only 3 or 4 councillors as part of our STV-PR
>>> package  -  that's practical politics.  But that reform has
>>> transformed our local government  -  no more "one-party states".
>>>
>>> James Gilmour
>>>
>>>
>>> > -----Original Message-----
>>> > From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
>>> > [mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On
>>> > Behalf Of David L Wetzell
>>> > Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 2:49 PM
>>> > To: EM
>>> > Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base
>>> > which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed
>>> > about the elections.
>>> >
>>> > Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types
>>> > of quotas.  STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in
>>> > the US.  I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify
>>> > things.  But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR
>>> > Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a
>>> > constructive role to play in US politics.
>>> >
>>> > So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps
>>> > using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the
>>> > vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional
>>> > elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for
>>> > state representative and aldermen elections.  The latter two
>>> > elections are less important and get less media coverage and
>>> > voter attention.  Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank
>>> > multiple candidates in an election where they often simply
>>> > vote their party line?  Why not keep it simple and use the
>>> > mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's
>>> > duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested?
>>> >
>>> > It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between
>>> > ranked choices or party-list PR.  I think it is a matter of
>>> > context and that both can be useful, especially when no
>>> > explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare
>>> > election.  The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats
>>> > a party wins could either be selected after the victory or
>>> > specified before hand.
>>> >
>>> > So what do you think?
>>> >
>>> > I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those
>>> > in power aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and
>>> > I'm not sure they're wrong about that, plus the US is used to
>>> > voting the candidate and having their representative and they
>>> > could keep that if there are relatively few seats per election.
>>> >
>>> > dlw
>>> >
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: "Markus Schulze" <Markus.Schulze at alumni.TU-Berlin.DE>
>>> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>>> Cc:
>>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 19:27:05 +0100
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Question about Schulze beatpath method
>>> Hallo,
>>>
>>> it can happen that the weakest link in the strongest path
>>> from candidate A to candidate B and the weakest link in the
>>> strongest path from candidate B to candidate A is the same link,
>>> say CD.
>>>
>>> I recommend that, in this case, the link CD should be declared
>>> "forbidden" and the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B
>>> and the strongest path from candidate B to candidate A, that does
>>> not contain a "forbidden" link, should be calculated. If again the
>>> weakest link in the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B
>>> and the weakest link in the strongest path from candidate B to
>>> candidate A is the same link (say EF), then also this link should
>>> be declared "forbidden" and the paths from A to B and from B to A
>>> should be calculated. This should be repeated until the weakest
>>> link in the strongest path from A to B and the weakest link in the
>>> strongest path from B to A are different links.
>>>
>>> Markus Schulze
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Election-Methods mailing list
>>> Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
>>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>>>
>>>
>>
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