[EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Wed Feb 8 14:53:34 PST 2012

Hi Robert,
I would +1 to Bryan Mills' post.
>in the two-candidate case, you would have to assume unequal treatment for voters
Yes, utility inherently does this. It's trying to maximize "happiness" which is a different ideal from giving
everyone equal weight (e.g. even people who don't have a strong opinion).
>but when Clay says that Score or Approval is better at picking the Condorcet winner than is a 
>Condorcet-compliant method, *that* is no tautology is obviously controversial, since it says that there is 
>a number closer to 3 than the number 3 itself.
What Clay means is that score/Approval are better at picking the *sincere* Condorcet winner. Yes, that's
obviously controversial. It could be true if it so happens that nobody wants to vote truthfully under
Condorcet methods, while Approval in practice never has any bad outcomes, etc.
>if it isn't 0 (for when you don't get who you voted for) and 1 (for when your candidate is elected), then 
>some voter is diluting their utilities and i think it's pretty useless and in bad taste to ask voters to do that 
>explicitly with a Score ballot.
"Utilities" refers to what voters actually "feel," not what they are putting on the ballot.
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