[EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sat Feb 4 23:03:33 PST 2012

 De : Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
À : electionscience at googlegroups.com 
Cc : EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com> 
Envoyé le : Vendredi 3 février 2012 22h06
Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet

>Condorcet systems fundamentally try to maximize the wrong thing. They try to maximize the odds of electing the Condorcet winner, even though it's a proven mathematical fact that the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the option whom the electorate prefers.
Trouble is that the ballots ARE the voters' statements as to which candidate IS the CW.  The above paragraph seems to be based on the ballots sometimes not truly representing the thoughts of the voters voting them.
No, he's saying that when the CW and the true, honest utility winner differ, the latter is better. I agree, but it's not an argument worth making, because most people who don't already agree will think it's a stupid one.

From my perspective the trouble with the top statement is that sincere Condorcet efficiency and utility performance seem to be correlated. I don't know any way
to design a method to specifically perform better at utility, assuming strategic voters.

Note that, if you try to take this issue back to Warren's sims, strategically-voted Condorcet methods within his framework have not just bad utility but bad sincere
Condorcet efficiency as well. (I don't know the numbers but it's impossible to believe they are any good.) So I don't know where one could look to argue that 
maximizing sincere Condorcet efficiency vs. utility performance can be done.

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20120205/7fd92e6f/attachment-0004.htm>

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list