[EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet
rbj at audioimagination.com
Sat Feb 4 21:01:04 PST 2012
On 2/4/12 10:39 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> With information like this it should be (in principle) a
> quite mechanical process to check all relevant available
> methods against the targets and environment description, and
> then pick the best method (and ballot format) (and guidance to
> the voters on how to vote).
> really? okay so, with a simple well-defined environment:
> Two-choice question, Competitive interests, High stakes, Decisive
> deadline, and Equal franchise for every voter; then what further
> questions need be settled to adopt a ballot format, tabulation
> method, and voter instructions?
> Those conditions beg the question.
i confess that i *am* doing that. i freely admit it.
> Of course, under those conditions, majority is the obvious choice. But
> you can't necessarily generalize that and say that anything but the CW
> is always wrong.
well, you're saying here that the CW is the obvious choice in the
Two-candidate case. then, to generalize with more candidates, you
impose another condition of logical consistency; essentially that of the
"independence of irrelevant alternatives". how can it be that: given
more voters agree that Candidate A is a better choice than Candidate B
means that Candidate B is not elected (as would happen it the
Two-candidate election), that this preference should be reversed if
Candidate C is brought into the race as a 3rd option? when (outside of
a cycle) should it ever be that Candidate B is elected despite the fact
that more voters expressed on their ballots that they preferred
Candidate A? (and continuing with the conditions of Competitiveness,
High stakes, Decisiveness, Equal franchise.)
i really think that the problem of working out the paradox of a cycle
should be approached after this fundamental issue is hammered out
first. and, although i don't see it as fundamental, it appears that
since Schulze, Minmax, and Ranked Pairs (margins) all elect the same if
no more than 3 are in the cycle, it looks to me that the cycle question
can be hammered out logically and simply with little chance of being
unexpectedly skunked by what does get hammered out. but before that, i
want to nail down the more fundamental issue of collective utility in a
governmental election that has conditions of Competitiveness, High
stakes, Decisiveness, and Equal franchise for every legitimate voter.
i really don't want this question distracted too much with "the guys and
i are going out for pizza." a little bit of distraction was okay, but
the give-and-take relationship with my pizza-and-beer buds is just not
the same as in a partisan contest that i bring my mace and shield.
r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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