[EM] Jameson: Repeating my statements

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/2/4 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>

>
> (By the way, Middle-When-Needed and Stepwise-When-Needed probably fail FBC. Of course, if they do, then I withdraw
> those suggestions.)
>
> Jameson:
>
> You said:
>
> Please repeat them [statements about MJ strategy]. (Doing so in the 1st place would have saved us both time).
>
> [endquote]
>
> No, what would have saved time would be if you'd initially read what you were replying to. And, failing that,
> if you'd at least looked at the recent earlier message to find out what you had been replying to.
>
> But here it is: (for some reason it double-spaced)
>
>
> But of course MJ differs from RV in the following way: In RV, if you rate x higher than y, you’re reliably, unquestionably, helping x against y. In MJ, of course that isn’t so. In fact, if you like x and y highly, and at all similarly, and rate sincerely, then you’re unlikely to help one against the other, at all.
>
> Another difference is that, in MJ, even if you correctly guess that you’re raising a candidate’s median, you can’t know by how much.
>
> Suppose x is your favorite. y is almost as good. Say the rating range is 0-100. You sincerely give 100 to x, and 90 to y.
>
> Say I prefer y to x, and, as do you, I consider their merit about the same. If I rated sincerely, I’d give y 100 and x 90.
>
> But, unlike you, I don’t vote sincerely. Because x is a rival to y, and maybe also because I expect you to rate sincerely, I take advantage of your sincerity by giving y 100, and giving x zero.
>
> Because different people have different favorites and near-favorites, your high rating of x and y is probably above those candidates’ median ratings. So you’re raising the medians of both candidates, with no particular reason to believe that you’re raising one’s median more than that of the other.
>
> In our above-described example, that’s what you’re doing: Raising the medians of x and y. Probably by about the same amount. I, however, am raising y's median and lowering x's median. You’re raising my candidate’s median, and I’m lowering your candidate’s median. You aren’t helping x against y. I’m helping y against x.
>
> You’ve been had.
>
>
Say your honest ratings for Y and X (on a 1-6 scale where 6 is best) are 5
an 4. You can, with probability over 99%, achieve the same effect by voting
5 and 2. Unlike with Range, you do not have to vote max and min -- in this
case, 6 and 1 -- in order to be strategic.

Note that MJ is typically not used on a 0-100 scale; part of the nature of
the system is that it uses independently meaningful rating categories. (I
only used 1-6 above to avoid having to list all the categories).

> At least in RV, you’d have reliably somewhat helped x against y.
>
>
The payoff for voting strategically in this chicken dilemma case is also
greater with range. That is, under range, even though my honest vote is
slightly counterbalancing your strategic one, it actually takes more
strategic voters to swing the election than under MJ. Unintuitive but true;
the basic reason is that, even though some voters on my side will have no
impact with their vote, this is more than offset by the ones whose honest
vote naturally has a maximum impact even though they didn't exaggerate.


>
> There's something familiar about that strategy situation :-)  MJ fully has the co-operation/defection problem.
>
> Again, I acknowledged this fact last time.


>
>
> [end of re-posted statements]
>
>
> Jameson, maybe you should look up the meaning of "instrumental voting" or "instrumental strategy".
>
> It refers to an effort (only) to affect the result of the current election.
>
> So you wouldn't vote instrumentally in MJ. Good.  Suckers are easily taken advantage of.
>
> Less easily under MJ than under many other systems, including the ones
you're proposing.

>
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
> ----
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>
>
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