[EM] [CES #4429] Looking at Condorcet
elections at jenningsstory.com
Fri Feb 3 21:04:41 PST 2012
On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 2:05 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:
> How would you vote with SODA?
I would usually end up delegating to my favorite. I'd look at their
ranking and if it was pretty good I'd delegate. Otherwise, I'd probably
come up with my own ranking (perhaps based on theirs) and then choose a
cutoff and vote approval-style.
So my strategy would be pretty similar to yours, I think.
> (go ahead and think of your answer before you read mine)
> I think I'd almost always just delegate to my favorite with SODA. If I
> don't like my favorite's delegation order, that would make me reconsider
> whether they're really my favorite. If I decide they still are, I would
> consider whether I thought the difference between my preferred order and
> their predeclared preferences would matter. If I decide it does, then look
> for the best candidate I think has a chance, and vote for them and everyone
> better. Chances of me ever getting to that last step would around one in
> 10, I reckon.
> 2012/2/3 Andy Jennings <elections at jenningsstory.com>
>> On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 10:09 PM, Richard Fobes <
>> ElectionMethods at votefair.org> wrote:
>>> On 2/2/2012 11:07 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>>> On 02/02/2012 05:28 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>>> I honestly think that honest rating is easier than honest ranking.
>>> As a contrast, to me, ranking is easier than rating. ...
>>> I too find ranking easier than rating.
>> I go back and forth on this, myself. Some thoughts:
>> - If I had to rank more than ten candidates, I think it would be
>> difficult unless I put them into three or four tiers first. Then, perhaps
>> I would choose to rank the candidates within the tiers or perhaps I would
>> leave them all tied if I didn't really care that much. Thus, for me,
>> honest rating with just a few buckets is more basic than ranking.
>> - If someone built a computer program that presented me pairs of
>> candidates at a time as Kristofer suggested, that would make it somewhat
>> easier. I think I would still prefer to divide them into tiers first, but
>> if I divided them into tiers first, I might not need the pairwise
>> comparison hand-holding. Also, suppose that I analyzed the candidates in
>> three different policy dimensions that I consider equally important and I
>> found that my policy preferences were:
>> Foreign Policy: A>B>C
>> Domestic Social Issues: B>C>A
>> Domestic Economic Issues: C>A>B
>> Now I prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. A cycle among my own personal
>> preferences when I compare them pairwise. Then my output ranking would
>> depend on the order in which the pairwise questions were asked. ??!?
>> - If I were trying to cast an honest Approval Ballot, then I would think
>> about each candidate separately and decide whether I approve them or not.
>> - If I were trying to cast a strategic Approval Ballot or a fully
>> strategic Score Voting Ballot, then I would first rank all the candidates,
>> then decide where to put my cutoff. So I can definitely see the argument
>> of those who think that ranking is more fundamental than even approval
>> - If I were trying to cast an honest Score Voting Ballot, I would have to
>> feel like there was an objective meaning for the various scores. Then I
>> could consider each candidate separately and give them my honest scores. I
>> probably wouldn't even normalize. If I were going to normalize, then I
>> might as well go fully-strategic and vote approval-style.
>> - If I were casting an MJ ballot, I think I would consider each candidate
>> separately and vote completely honestly, knowing that my vote was doing
>> everything it could to help any candidate where my score was higher than
>> society's median and, similarly, doing everything it could to hurt any
>> candidate where my score was lower than society's median. I realize that
>> my vote would not be fully strategic if there were two frontrunners and I
>> liked both of them or disliked both of them, but in that situation, who
>> - If a real election were being tabulated with Condorcet, I would vote
>> - If a real election were being tabulated with IRV, I would warn people
>> not to vote for minor candidates.
>> Let me admit that a crucial point for me is that the only way to gain
>> Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is to tell the voters to evaluate
>> each candidate independently and vote honestly, which may make me biased
>> towards rating methods. FBC is very important to me and I'm still
>> skeptical of the FBC-compliant ranked-ballot methods recently proposed.
>> ~ Andy
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the Election-Methods