[EM] Richard: Approval vs Condorcet.

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Sun Apr 29 15:44:39 PDT 2012


Any spectators, please don't overdo your reading.

This started with Mike O describing one voter changing a vote for  
Favorite vs Compromise and this somehow affecting Compromise vs Worse.

Now it has grown to many votes, which could involve cycles - with many  
votes the destination can be far from the source.

A cycle can be of three or more candidates, such as A>B>C>A, in which  
each wins over the next and one link is broken - change the content  
enough and the cycle is broken or the broken link moves to a different  
point.

Seems to me Mike O could be clearer with many less words.

Dave Ketchum

On Apr 29, 2012, at 3:09 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> What happened to Richard's promise to not read my postings? :-)
> Instead of continuing to repeat that he doesn't read them, maybe it  
> would be better
> if he could actually llve up to that promise.
> Given Richard's particularly low level of discussion, that of a  
> common Internet flamewarrior,
> it would definitely be better not to hear from Richard. Richard's  
> presence lowers the quality
> of EM discussion, and I would thank him to stay out of my discussions.
>
> Paul said:
>
> On 4/28/12 11:46 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
> > It fails when approval is used as vote counting method. In approval
> > COUNTING, if you voted Favorite above Compromise, you vote  
> Favorite EQUAL
> > Compromise, and even though you don't like Compromise, you helped  
> elect the
> > idiot.
> Then don't approve him. Approve candidates whom you like, trust, or  
> consider deserving of your support.
> Or use the simple strategies that I described.
> No one will force you to approve a compromise if you don't want to.  
> You're free to approve only your favorite.
> I've already explained that Condorcet, contrary to popular belief  
> doesn't guarantee what you seem to want. I've
> discussed that at length. Read my previous postings.
>
> Richard says:
> >
> i've been saying this for months.  in Approval voting, how does a  
> voter
> decide whether to approve of their 2nd choice.
> [endquote]
> I've amply discussed that. I'm not going to repeat it again for  
> Richard.
> Richard says:
> they surely want their
> 2nd choice to beat their most hated candidate, but they don't want to
> help their 2nd choice to beat their favorite.
> [endquote]
>
> Wouldn't it be nice if we could always have what we want :-)  Only  
> in LaLa Land does Condorcet give the
> ideal guarantee that Richard wants.
>
> Richard says:
>
> Approval sucks.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Is that supposed to be a compelling argsument?  :-)  ...or just  
> another example of what Richard has to offer?
>
>
> Richard says:
> you just cannot say that these two systems speak adequately to the
> burden of tactical voting they place upon voters.
> [endquote]
>
> Just approve candidates whom you like, trust, &/or consider  
> deserving of your support.
>
> If there unacceptable candidates who could win, then approbve the  
> acceptables and no one else.
>
> Additionally, I've described various simple and _unburdeonsome_  
> strategies that you could use, if you wish to.
>
> > On Apr 28, 2012, at 5:04 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> > ....
> >> For one thing, Condorcet discourages honesty,
> Richard says:
> this is just stupid.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Another of Richard's compelling arguments :-) and a further example  
> of his Internet manners.
>
>
> >>   because, even if you
> >> top-rank Compromise, top-ranking Favorite too can cause  
> Compromise to
> >> lose to Worse.
>
> as long as Compromise is ranked above Worse, it doesn't matter what  
> you
> do to Favorite, you are not affecting your contribution to  
> Compromise's
> position with respect to Worse's position (your vote increases
> Compomise's lead over Worse or decreases Worse's lead over  
> Compromise).
> [endquote]
>
> Only in LaLa Land. Richard apparently is unaware of EM discussion  
> about Condorcet's properties.
> That explains his misbeliefs about Condorcet's properties.
>
> Maybe Favorite barely pairwise-beats Compromise. There is a cycle  
> that includes
> Favorite, Compromise, and Worse. Worse, by Condorcet's rules, is the  
> winner among
> the candidates of that cycle. You (and maybe a few who agree with  
> you) have been
> ranking Favorite over Compromise. Suppose you change your ballots,  
> to move Compromise
> up to 1st place, equal to Favorite. Now you are't voting Favorite  
> over Compromise.
>
> But,regrettably, there aren't enough of you to thereby keep Favorite  
> from pair-beating
> Compromise. But, if you and your friends were to vote Compromise  
> _over_ Favorite,then
> you could reverse that defeat. Compromise's only defeat was by  
> Favoite, and now Compromise
> is the voted CW, because you and your friends have voted Compromise  
> over Favorite.
>
> In other words,as I said, if you aren't voting Compromise _alone_ in  
> 1st place, then
> you aren't helping Compromise against Worse as much as you could. If  
> you want to _fully
> and reliably_ help the Democrat against the Republican in  
> Condorcet,then you'd better
> vote the Democrat alone in 1st place.
>
> >>   ....when ranking Compromise _alone_ in 1st place would
> >> have defeated Worse. To do your best to defeat Worse, you have to  
> vote
> >> Favorite below Compromise.
>
> baloney.
> [endquote]
>
> See above.
>
> Richard says:
>
>  ...unless you're assuming some kind of pathological cycle is to
> happen.
> [endquote]
>
> Not a pathological cycle. Just a cycle in which Favorite pairbeats  
> Compromise, and in which
> Worse wins.
>
> Richard says:
> and i don't accept that cycles are anywhere close to common.
> [endquote]
> There are various ways in which natural and strategic cycles can  
> occur. The obsessive compromose-protector
> can't fully and,as reliably as possible, help the Democrat against  
> the Republican without ranking the Democrat
> alone in 1st place, over hir favorite.
> >>   You have to say with your vote that
> >> Condorcet is better than Favorite.
>
> ???
>
> you mean "Compromise is better than Favorite."?
>
> if that is what you meant to say, then i say you are mistaken.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Yes, I meant "compromise", rather than "Condorcet" there. But no,  
> I'm not saying
> that Compromise is better
>  than Favorite. But your ranking of Compromise over Favorite will  
> tell others
> that you think that Compromise is better than Favorite.
>
> Mike Ossipoff

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