[EM] Richard: Approval vs Condorcet.

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Sun Apr 29 12:09:38 PDT 2012

What happened to Richard's promise to not read my postings? :-)
Instead of continuing to repeat that he doesn't read them, maybe it would
be better
if he could actually llve up to that promise.
Given Richard's particularly low level of discussion, that of a common
Internet flamewarrior,
it would definitely be better not to hear from Richard. Richard's presence
lowers the quality
of EM discussion, and I would thank him to stay out of my discussions.

Paul said:

On 4/28/12 11:46 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
>* It fails when approval is used as vote counting method. In approval*>* COUNTING, if you voted Favorite above Compromise, you vote Favorite EQUAL*>* Compromise, and even though you don't like Compromise, you helped elect the*>* idiot.*

Then don't approve him. Approve candidates whom you like, trust, or
consider deserving of your support.

Or use the simple strategies that I described.

No one will force you to approve a compromise if you don't want to.
You're free to approve only your favorite.

I've already explained that Condorcet, contrary to popular belief
doesn't guarantee what you seem to want. I've

discussed that at length. Read my previous postings.

Richard says:

>**i've been saying this for months.  in Approval voting, how does a voter
decide whether to approve of their 2nd choice.


I've amply discussed that. I'm not going to repeat it again for Richard.

Richard says:

they surely want their
2nd choice to beat their most hated candidate, but they don't want to
help their 2nd choice to beat their favorite.


Wouldn't it be nice if we could always have what we want :-)  Only in
LaLa Land does Condorcet give the

ideal guarantee that Richard wants.

Richard says:

Approval sucks.


Is that supposed to be a compelling argsument?  :-)  ...or just
another example of what Richard has to offer?

Richard says:

you just cannot say that these two systems speak adequately to the
burden of tactical voting they place upon voters.


Just approve candidates whom you like, trust, &/or consider deserving
of your support.

If there unacceptable candidates who could win, then approbve the
acceptables and no one else.

Additionally, I've described various simple and _unburdeonsome_
strategies that you could use, if you wish to.

>* On Apr 28, 2012, at 5:04 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:*>* ....*>>* For one thing, Condorcet discourages honesty,*

*Richard says:*

this is just stupid.


Another of Richard's compelling arguments :-) and a further example of
his Internet manners.

>>*   because, even if you*>>* top-rank Compromise, top-ranking Favorite too can cause Compromise to*>>* lose to Worse.*
as long as Compromise is ranked above Worse, it doesn't matter what you
do to Favorite, you are not affecting your contribution to Compromise's
position with respect to Worse's position (your vote increases
Compomise's lead over Worse or decreases Worse's lead over Compromise).


Only in LaLa Land. Richard apparently is unaware of EM discussion
about Condorcet's properties.

That explains his misbeliefs about Condorcet's properties.

Maybe Favorite barely pairwise-beats Compromise. There is a cycle that includes

Favorite, Compromise, and Worse. Worse, by Condorcet's rules, is the
winner among

the candidates of that cycle. You (and maybe a few who agree with you) have been

ranking Favorite over Compromise. Suppose you change your ballots, to
move Compromise

up to 1st place, equal to Favorite. Now you are't voting Favorite over

But,regrettably, there aren't enough of you to thereby keep Favorite
from pair-beating

Compromise. But, if you and your friends were to vote Compromise
_over_ Favorite,then

you could reverse that defeat. Compromise's only defeat was by
Favoite, and now Compromise

is the voted CW, because you and your friends have voted Compromise
over Favorite.

In other words,as I said, if you aren't voting Compromise _alone_ in
1st place, then

you aren't helping Compromise against Worse as much as you could. If
you want to _fully

and reliably_ help the Democrat against the Republican in
Condorcet,then you'd better

vote the Democrat alone in 1st place.

>>*   ....when ranking Compromise _alone_ in 1st place would*>>* have defeated Worse. To do your best to defeat Worse, you have to vote*>>* Favorite below Compromise.*


See above.

Richard says:

 ...unless you're assuming some kind of pathological cycle is to


Not a pathological cycle. Just a cycle in which Favorite pairbeats
Compromise, and in which

Worse wins.

Richard says:

and i don't accept that cycles are anywhere close to common.


There are various ways in which natural and strategic cycles can
occur. The obsessive compromose-protector

can't fully and,as reliably as possible, help the Democrat against the
Republican without ranking the Democrat

alone in 1st place, over hir favorite.

>>*   You have to say with your vote that*>>* Condorcet is better than Favorite.*

you mean "Compromise is better than Favorite."?

if that is what you meant to say, then i say you are mistaken.


Yes, I meant "compromise", rather than "Condorcet" there. But no, I'm not saying

that Compromise is better
 than Favorite. But your ranking of Compromise over Favorite will tell others

that you think that Compromise is better than Favorite.

Mike Ossipoff
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