[EM] Kristofer: Approval vs Condorcet, 4/28/12

[Paul Kislanko]

It fails when approval is used as vote counting method. In approval
COUNTING, if you voted Favorite above Compromise, you vote Favorite EQUAL
Compromise, and even though you don't like Compromise, you helped elect the
idiot.

-----Original Message-----
From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Dave
Ketchum
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2012 9:15 PM
To: Michael Ossipoff
Cc: election-methods at electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Kristofer: Approval vs Condorcet, 4/28/12

On Apr 28, 2012, at 5:04 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
....
> For one thing, Condorcet discourages honesty, because, even if you 
> top-rank Compromise, top-ranking Favorite too can cause Compromise to 
> lose to Worse. ....when ranking Compromise _alone_ in 1st place would 
> have defeated Worse. To do your best to defeat Worse, you have to vote 
> Favorite below Compromise. You have to say with your vote that 
> Condorcet is better than Favorite. Consider that before you criticize 
> Approval for not letting you vote Favorite over a needed compromise.
>
What is going on here?

I properly have to rank Favorite above Compromise.  Exactly how can this
fail?





----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info