[EM] (no subject)

[Dave Ketchum]

On Apr 22, 2012, at 11:14 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> I missed the fact that Dave was answering my question here, and so  
> I'll reply to his answer:
>
> I'd said:
>
> "Approved" ratings wins. The result? Well, we'd be electing the most
> approved candidate, wouldn't we.  Who can criticize that?
>
> > Dave says: >
>
> > The voter who did not have equal liking for all Approved.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Ok, Dave is saying that that voter could complain about electing the  
> most approved candidate, the
> candidate to whom most people have given an approval.
>
> One can only wonder how that voter would criticize electing the  
> candidate to whom the most voters
> have given an approval.
>
> Dave is welcome to share with us the complaint that that voter could  
> make. Dave, don't forget to include
> that voter's justification for his complaint. Let your hypothetical  
> voter tell us what is wrong with electing the candidate
> to whom the most voters have given an approval.
>
> But I'm going to guess what Dave means. He's saying that he wants  
> more; he wants something else. He wants
> the expressivity of rank balloting. No matter how much Dave wants  
> that, it doesn't amount to something wrong
> with electing the candidate to whom the most candidates have given  
> an approval.
>
> Certainly Dave can make that complaint--that he wants something  
> more. But his complaint and ambitions don't amount
> to an answer to my question (when I asked who could object to  
> electing the candidate to whom the most voters have
> given an approval.
>
> The rank-balloting advocates' ohjection, desire and ambition  
> certainly deserves to be answered. I will answer it in a subsequent
> post (though I answered it to a large extent in the part of my  
> article that discusses Approval's advantages--I invite Dave to re- 
> read that part).

To try to sort out the question:
.     In Plurality voters objected to being unable to vote for more  
than  one.
.     Approval is better, for having fixed that, so now voters wish  
they could express preferences as to which candidate they like better.
>
> Quite aside from that, is the important question that can be asked  
> about any propoesd replacement for Plurality:
>
> "Is this method going to turn out to be worse than Plurality? Does  
> it have unforseen consequences and problems that will have
> some unspecified disastrous effect?"

Proper question when considering any new method, whatever the current  
base may be.  IRV is an example that scares thinkers.
>
> I know that I've already addressed this problem, and pointed out  
> that Approval's stark, elegant, transparent simplicity doesn't leave
> any room for that question. That was why I asked who could object to  
> electing the candidate to whom the most voters have given an
> approval.
>
> You see, it's one thing to say, "I want something even better. I  
> claim that there can be more, and I want to ask for more!"
>
> But it's quite another thing to be able to claim that the method  
> will be worse than Plurality.  It was regarding that, that I asked my
> question, "Who could object...".

You refer back to Plurality here - but from context we were at  
Approval and those of us who looked ahead realized that we need  
something better.

DWK
>
> I'm addressing the person who wants to keep Plurality. The person  
> who wants to say thalt Approval would be worse than Plurality.
>
> One question that I'd ask that person is, "Ok, then what's wrong  
> with electing the candidate whom the most people have approved?"
>
> I'd also remind that person that the only difference between  
> Approval and Plurality is that the person who, in Pluralilty  
> approves a compromise candidate
> who isn't his favorite, would, in Approval, be able to also approve  
> everyone he likes more, including his favorite(s). People are then  
> supporting
> candidates whom they like more. The winner will be someone who is  
> more liked by all of those people. Thats's another thing that would  
> be difficult for the Plurality-defender to object to.
>
> Another question that I'd ask the Plurality-defender is; What's  
> wrong with letting each voter have equal power to rate each  
> candidate?  ...equal power to give to each candidate one point or 0  
> points?  ...or, which amounts to the same, to give to each candidate  
> an "Approved" rating or an "Unapproved" rating?
>
> In fact, what's wrong with getting rid of Plurality's forced  
> falsification (which I described in the article)?
>
> It's easy to show that Approval will be an improvement on Plurality,  
> and nothing but an improvement. That can't be said for more  
> complicated methods, such as the rank-balloting contraptions.
>
> I've already said all this in the article. With any method more  
> complicated than Approval, the public aren't going to be able to be  
> sure that it
> won't make things worse. Rank methods are contraptions. How many  
> peoiple will feel confident that they know what those complicated
> contraptions will do? And what they'll do wrong sometimes?  
> Opponents, media, etc. will be able to take full advantage of that
> uncertainty.
>
> I've already said that, if it could be enacted, and if people could  
> understand or trust its FBC compliance, I'd like ICT as the my  
> favorite choice of voting system. But those conditions don't obtain,  
> and so I don't propose ICT, or any other rank method.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
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> ----
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