[EM] (no subject)

[Michael Ossipoff]

I missed the fact that Dave was answering my question here, and so I'll
reply to his answer:

I'd said:

"Approved" ratings wins. The result? Well, we'd be electing the most
approved candidate, wouldn't we.  Who can criticize that?

>* Dave says: *>* *

>* The voter who did not have equal liking for all Approved. *
**
*[endquote]*
**
*Ok, Dave is saying that that voter could complain about electing the most
approved candidate, the*
*candidate to whom most people have given an approval. *
**
*One can only wonder how that voter would criticize electing the candidate
to whom the most voters*
*have given an approval.*
**
*Dave is welcome to share with us the complaint that that voter could make.
Dave, don't forget to include*
*that voter's justification for his complaint. Let your hypothetical voter
tell us what is wrong with electing the candidate*
*to whom the most voters have given an approval.*
**
*But I'm going to guess what Dave means. He's saying that he wants more; he
wants something else. He wants*
*the expressivity of rank balloting. No matter how much Dave wants that, it
doesn't amount to something wrong*
*with electing the candidate to whom the most candidates have given an
approval.*
**
*Certainly Dave can make that complaint--that he wants something more. But
his complaint and ambitions don't amount*
*to an answer to my question (when I asked who could object to electing the
candidate to whom the most voters have*
*given an approval.*
**
*The rank-balloting advocates' ohjection, desire and ambition certainly
deserves to be answered. I will answer it in a subsequent*
*post (though I answered it to a large extent in the part of my article
that discusses Approval's advantages--I invite Dave to re-read that part).*
**
*Quite aside from that, is the important question that can be asked about
any propoesd replacement for Plurality:*
**
*"Is this method going to turn out to be worse than Plurality? Does it have
unforseen consequences and problems that will have*
*some unspecified disastrous effect?"*
**
*I know that I've already addressed this problem, and pointed out that
Approval's stark, elegant, transparent simplicity doesn't leave*
*any room for that question. That was why I asked who could object to
electing the candidate to whom the most voters have given an*
*approval.*
**
*You see, it's one thing to say, "I want something even better. I claim
that there can be more, and I want to ask for more!"*
**
*But it's quite another thing to be able to claim that the method will be
worse than Plurality.  It was regarding that, that I asked my*
*question, "Who could object...". *
**
*I'm addressing the person who wants to keep Plurality. The person who
wants to say thalt Approval would be worse than Plurality.*
**
*One question that I'd ask that person is, "Ok, then what's wrong with
electing the candidate whom the most people have approved?"*
**
*I'd also remind that person that the only difference between Approval and
Plurality is that the person who, in Pluralilty approves a compromise
candidate*
*who isn't his favorite, would, in Approval, be able to also approve
everyone he likes more, including his favorite(s). People are then
supporting*
*candidates whom they like more. The winner will be someone who is more
liked by all of those people. Thats's another thing that would be difficult
for the Plurality-defender to object to.*
**
*Another question that I'd ask the Plurality-defender is; What's wrong with
letting each voter have equal power to rate each candidate?  ...equal power
to give to each candidate one point or 0 points?  ...or, which amounts to
the same, to give to each candidate an "Approved" rating or an "Unapproved"
rating?*
**
*In fact, what's wrong with getting rid of Plurality's forced falsification
(which I described in the article)? *
**
*It's easy to show that Approval will be an improvement on Plurality, and
nothing but an improvement. That can't be said for more complicated
methods, such as the rank-balloting contraptions.*
**
*I've already said all this in the article. With any method more
complicated than Approval, the public aren't going to be able to be sure
that it*
*won't make things worse. Rank methods are contraptions. How many peoiple
will feel confident that they know what those complicated*
*contraptions will do? And what they'll do wrong sometimes? Opponents,
media, etc. will be able to take full advantage of that*
*uncertainty.*
**
*I've already said that, if it could be enacted, and if people could
understand or trust its FBC compliance, I'd like ICT as the my favorite
choice of voting system. But those conditions don't obtain, and so I don't
propose ICT, or any other rank method.*
**
*Mike Ossipoff*
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