[EM] A modification to Condorcet so that one can vote against monsters.

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Sat Apr 14 06:04:04 PDT 2012

2012/4/14 Andrew Myers <andru at cs.cornell.edu>

> On 4/14/12 8:31 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>> On 4/14/12 3:45 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
>>> ¡Hello!
>>> ¿How fare you?
>>> It is tedious to rank hundreds of candidates, but sometimes monster is
>>> on the ballot and all unranked candidates are last. If the field is so
>>> polarized that the voters idiotically refuse to rank other serious
>>> candidates other than their candidate and the evil candidate has followers,
>>> the bad candidate might win. I suggest that Condorcet should have a
>>> dummy-candidate:
>>> 0 The ranked candidates.
>>> 1 The unranked candidates.
>>> 2 The dummy-canditate.
>>> 3 The monsters.
>>> All unranked candidates have higher ranks than the monsters. One can
>>> then rank the monsters by how terrible they are.
>>> Basically, it is a way to vote against monsters in Condorcet without
>>> having to rank all of the hundreds of also-rans.
>> all this is complicated crap that gunks up elections. it has an
>> ice-cube's chance in hell.
>>  I've been observing experimentally how people use a Condorcet election
> system in practice over the past ten years (since 2003) and in fact the use
> of a dummy candidate to signal approval has become increasingly common. It
> seems to be intuitive, at least to web users, and effective. I do agree
> that trying to distinguish 0 vs. 1 is probably overly complicated.
> -- Andrew

Good response. A few examples would be even better.

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