[EM] A modification to Condorcet so that one can vote against monsters.
andru at cs.cornell.edu
Sat Apr 14 05:42:20 PDT 2012
On 4/14/12 8:31 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> On 4/14/12 3:45 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
>> ¿How fare you?
>> It is tedious to rank hundreds of candidates, but sometimes monster
>> is on the ballot and all unranked candidates are last. If the field
>> is so polarized that the voters idiotically refuse to rank other
>> serious candidates other than their candidate and the evil candidate
>> has followers, the bad candidate might win. I suggest that Condorcet
>> should have a dummy-candidate:
>> 0 The ranked candidates.
>> 1 The unranked candidates.
>> 2 The dummy-canditate.
>> 3 The monsters.
>> All unranked candidates have higher ranks than the monsters. One can
>> then rank the monsters by how terrible they are.
>> Basically, it is a way to vote against monsters in Condorcet without
>> having to rank all of the hundreds of also-rans.
> all this is complicated crap that gunks up elections. it has an
> ice-cube's chance in hell.
I've been observing experimentally how people use a Condorcet election
system in practice over the past ten years (since 2003) and in fact the
use of a dummy candidate to signal approval has become increasingly
common. It seems to be intuitive, at least to web users, and effective.
I do agree that trying to distinguish 0 vs. 1 is probably overly
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