[EM] Paul: Could you be more specific about exactly what your concern is?

[Michael Ossipoff]

Paul:

You said:

Which still begs the more important question. My point was that
hand-counting ONLY verifies the accuracy of the original count. It does not
address the (more important) questions of whether my ballot was counted as I
intended either time.

[endquote]

If count accuracy is verified, then the matter if your ballot was counted
as you intended
depends on whether you want your ballot counted accurately, or inaccurately.

If you want it counted accurately, and if accuracy is verified, then your
ballot was indeed
counted as you intended.

Or are we still back at your concern that the machine might prilnt out
something different from
what you voted on the touchscreen? I'll repeat for the 5th or 6th time that
you should always
check your printed ballot, to make sure that it is what you intend, before
depositing it in the
slot in the ballot-box.

You continued:

Even if you alter every vote-collecting method to match something suitable
for a hand-count, all you've done is verify the count.

[endquote]

You aren't being at all clear about what you're talking about. Veriflyng
the count is good
enough, one would expect. Of course it's necessary to also ensure that the
ballots being
counted are genuine. Is that what you mean?

Yes: If the handcount were done by governement-appointed Republicans, in a
closed room, after which
the ballots were destroyed, then a handcount would be just like our current
machine-counts.

But handcounts aren't done like that, are they. They're done openly,
observed by all.

Have representatives of all parts of the political spectrum up close to
observe the count in person.

Have video-cameras recording the entire count, and looking at every
ballot-stack and ballot-box and
counting station, and all of the count personnel, from all angles, wide
angle and close-up.

Representatives of all parts of the political spectrum should accompany the
ballots to their storage
room, which would have several locks, each of which can be opened by only
one of those representatives.
The inside of the room, and the door to it should be well-covered by
several video cameras, preferably
owned and operated by those representatives, and un-tamperable.

If you can get degree of count-fraud security with a machine-count, then I
congratulate you. Then I'd have
no objection to a machine-count. You said something about public-key
encription possibly playing a role,
and that would be great, if it could help to achieve reliable security in a
machine coulnt.

You continue:

Fraud or mistakes do
not typically come from counting errors.

[endquote]

But how would you Paul know that, when the count result is
unverified?

Look at articles after the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, such as
the Harpers magazine
article soon after the 2004 count, and then tell me that count fraud isn't
a problem.

Must go now. This reply to be continued...

Mike Ossipoff
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