[EM] Kristofer: Yes, maybe Condorcet could overcome its disadvantages.

[Michael Ossipoff]

...but wouldn't it be better not to have the disadvantags?

As you suggested, if Condorcet were proposed municipally, maybe (as was the
case with IRV
in some municipalities) big outside money won't come in to emphasize
rank-balloting methods
complete novelty, unknown-ness, unfamiliarity and unpredictability.

But maybe the reason why that wasn't always done to IRV proposals was
because
the big opponents knew that IRV wasn't going to really improve on
Pluralilty anyway,
given current electorates.

And you further suggested, when people become familiar with Condorcet's
properties, by
experience in municipal use, maybe they'll realize that FBC violations are
rare--usually
no one will regret ranking their favorite in 1st place.

Right, and a good enough boxer might be able to win while holding one hand
behind his back. Heroic, but maybe not the best idea.

Why would we want to have the disadvantages of Condorcet, if they can be
avoided?

Not only would approval have an incomparably better chance for relatively
quick national
adoption, but Approval (nothing other than an elimination of Plurality's
nonsensical
falsification-requirement) rightfully qualifies as a voting-rights issue, a
rights remedy that
could and should be required by the courts.

And, if anyone is going to propose something more complicated than
Approval, it should
be something that better gets rid of the co-operation/defection problem
(C/D). ICT greately
mitigates that problem, is defection-resistant. That can't be said for
Condorcet. Compare
Condorcet and ICT in the usual Approval bad-example, the 27,24,49 example.

Mike Ossipoff
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