[EM] Public political election methods for different electorates and societies (mostly Fantasy Land). CT method.

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Thu Apr 19 22:42:27 PDT 2012


Method Choices in Fantasy Land:



I've been talking about how some methods would be good for different
electorates, or public discussion/information conditions different from our
own. When making such statements, I've told why. When I make new statements
about that here, I'll likewise try to justify my statements, or at least
tell why I make them.



These different methods for different electorates and societies should be
given in list form.



Before I start, let me define a method: Condorcet-Top (CT).



CW wins. "Winning set" means cycle, or set of pairwise-unbeaten candidates.
If no unique CW, winner is winning-set member at first place in the most
rankings.



Returning to considerations for choosing methods:



One consideration, for judging what is enactable is the situation with
regard to the possibility of genuinely open discussion, democratic equal
access to media, and the free availability of honest information. Maybe, if
we shouldn't blame it all on external influences, public interest and
judgement about voting systems should be included in this consideration.
I'll cover that first, because it's simpler:



By this consideration, under the existing conditions, only Approval has any
chance of enactment.



But, enactability aside, what about which methods would be desirable under
different strategic and moral/ethical conditions?



I divide voter-strategic-inclination into two parts: favorite-burial
inclination without FBC , and inclination to trust reformers' assurances
that favorite-burial is unnecessary



(The 4 column headings take up more width than the entries, and threrefore
they aren't over their columns, but each is for one of the 4columns of
entries)



"N.A" for favorite-burial and FBC-assurance-trusting means "inapplicable
because voters aren't strategic".



favorite-burial-inclination (with non FBC method).......inclination to
trust FBC assurances.......moral/ethical......suitable method(s)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Like Now ......Poor........Like Now.......Approval





Like Now.......Good.......Like Now.......Approval

............................................................or ICT





Low...............Good.......Like Now........Approval

.............................................................or ICT

.............................................................or CT







N.A. ...............N.A........Completely......Range

......................................Unselfish.........or ICT

..............................................................or CT

..............................................................or Approval





I include Approval under all four sets of conditions, because it has
desirable qualities under all conditions.

But under the more favorable conditioins, other methods, too, become
desirable, in different ways, by different

consideratios.



In general, when more favorable condtions allow additional methods, which
bring new desirable properties, it

doesn't mean that the methods for worse conditions should no longer be
considered. It merely means that the

new desirable properties are available.



My choices (As I feel about it today, at least) would be:



Condition-set 1:  Approval

Condition-set 2: ICT

Condition-set 3: ICT
Condition-set 4: Range

I emphasize that conditon set 1,  the curretly-existing one, doesn't really
allow any feasible and
helpful choices other than Approval.

I choose ICT in condition sets 2 and 3, mostly because it's
defection-resistant, but its unlimited ranking, sincerity-encouragement,
which is
best-of-all among rank methods adds, just slightly, to its merit too.

In condition-set 3, some would prefer CT, if they think that Condorcet's
Critrerion is more important than FBC, for an electorate who don't need
FBC. There's no right or wrong there. It's a matter of opinion. Personally,
I feelthat FBC remains better to have than Condorcet's Criterion even when
the electorate don't really need FBC. But others can reasonably disagree
with me on that. It would depend, of course, on how the electorate felt,
regarding which critrerion they like more.

You'll notice that I didn't include some Condorcet versions that are
popular here, such as Beatpath, etc. That's because they aren't defection
resistant, and therefore don't qualify for consideration when ICT, or even
CT, is available.

ICT is defection resistant, but its defection-resistance is so good that it
might qualify as defection-proof.



I want to remind you, however, that we are in condition-set 1.  Not only is
Approval the only enactable reform (let's not count the fact that heavy
spending enacted IRV in a few munipalities), but it's the only one
suitable, given the electorate's strategic inclinations, as expressed in
the column headings.

In our voting system recommendations and advocacy, I feel that we're all
talking about methods for different
condition-sets. I feel that, at this time, we needn't worry about what
methods would be good in the various
above-described versions of Fantasy Land. We need to choose a method for
the currently existing conditions.
That's why I advocate and recommend Approval.

P.S. I'd probably vote ICT just as I'd vote Abucklin: The candidates below
top rank, and above bottom rank
would be the same one's that I'd middle-rate in MCA or MTA. And those would
be only the ones that are almost deserving of being
approved in Approval, or almost deserving of being approved in Approval.

Mabye, if the elections weren't u/a (but they are), I'd eventually
cautiously rank more candidates between top and bottom. I don't
know. It isn't relevant to current conditions anyway.

Mike Ossipoff
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