[EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 87, Issue 54

[Kathy Dopp]

James,

My point is, that the two examples you gave IMO are very *strong*
Condorcet winners in the sense that the vast majority of voters would
prefer the Condorcet winner over one or the other of the other two
candidates which are far less popularly approved.

I think the IRV fanatics oppose centrist compromise winners who are
supported by a majority of voters whenever IRV would elect a less
popular winner. IRV proponents support a more extremist winner,
supported by far fewer voters as long as the candidate, enough to
fabricate hypothetical political consequences, claiming that a
majority people would oppose the Condorcet winner.  Sure, of course at
least a few persons who had supported the 1st round plurality winner
would complain, but that is probably all.  I.e. IRV proponents seem to
be deeply emotionally attached to the method, regardless of how much
unhappiness the outcome would cause in how large a proportion of
voters by eliminating the Condorcet winner, as it did in Burlington,
VT.

Burlington, VT is a real life counterexample to your counterfactual,
where people would have preferred the Condorcet winner and so got rid
of IRV.

On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 6:02 PM, James Gilmour <jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk> wrote:
> But you are completely missing the point of what I wrote.  It is the political consequences of the second result that are important.
>
> In the real world of partisan politics, such a weak Condorcet winner (and their policies) would likely be torn to shreds by the
> party politicians and their party members, to such an extent that s/he would be ineffectual in office.  And based on my experience
> of UK electors, with their majoritarian views of elections, the weak Condorcet winner would get little support from those whose
> votes had voted him or her into office.  It must be for others to judge whether the electors in their countries (USA, Canada) would
> react in a similar way, but I have seen nothing in the US or Canadian press to suggest otherwise.
>
> It is dirty practical politics that is the problem here, not the fact that voters could rank their choices honestly.  In my view,
> such a result would be less acceptable to the electors than the plurality result, despite all the obvious defects in the plurality
> voting.  That's just how it is  -  and if you want to achieve real, practical reform, you have to understand that.
>
> James Gilmour
>

>> >            35 A>C
>> >            34 B>C
>> >            31 C
>>
>>
>> >            48 A>C
>> >            47 B>C
>> >             5 C
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>
>



-- 

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."
"Renewable energy is homeland security."

Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections
http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174

View some of my research on my SSRN Author page:
http://ssrn.com/author=1451051