[EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch

[Jameson Quinn]

Latest version of the declaration. As always, feel free to edit the google
doc<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US>
.

Stephane: I've added your name as a "signature" to the google doc. You can
add your qualifications and/or preferred methods there if you wish.

Other would-be signers: please send your "signature" here on the mailing
list, in the following format:

name; email (obfuscated against spambots if you wish); qualifications;
preferred system(s)

Some responses to Dave Ketchum's specific comments are at the bottom of this
message.


Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Contents
Introduction - It is time to change our voting system.
Unfairness of plurality voting - Plurality voting is a bad method that is
used far too often.
Better ballots - With better information from the voters, we can elect
better winners.
Fairer counting methods - Together we endorse four voting methods that would
give more-democratic results.
Additional considerations

Proportional representation - Legislatures should represent all the voters,
not just a bare majority.

Using the fairer methods in organizations - Private organizations are a
great place to start voting reform.

Multiple rounds of voting - Good voting methods can reduce the need for
primaries and runoffs, or give even-better results when combined with such
extra rounds.

Separate reforms - Reforming the voting system helps with other democratic
reforms.
Benefits for all - Voting reform is truly a win/win solution that will help
all political groups.
Taking action - Here is what you can do to help reform voting methods.

Introduction
It is time to change our voting system.

We, the undersigned election-method experts and enthusiasts from around the
world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in elections in
which there are more than two candidates. In this declaration we offer
several ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will
reliably produce much fairer results.

We agree that there are no significant political or economic risks
associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In fact, we
believe that improving the fairness of election results will produce
substantial political and economic benefits.

We are confident that any of the systems we propose will bring at least the
following direct benefits:

   - Dramatically increased voter turnout because voters will have
   meaningful choices
   - Reduced voter frustration
   - Improved voice for significant minorities (although they still cannot
   out-vote the majority)
   - Improved understanding of what the majority of voters really want



We expect these additional direct benefits, although the degree of benefit
depends on additional factors:

   - Reduced influence of lobbyists, and increased influence of voters
   - Reduced dependence on campaign money in politics
   - Healthier political dialogue, with less focus on personal attacks and
   negative advertising
   - Greater accountability, which means that disliked incumbents can be
   replaced, without having to elect someone from a different party



We also believe that electing more-representative government leaders and
making them more accountable could lead to some or all of these broader,
indirect benefits:

   - Freer cooperation between groups that share common interests, with less
   infighting within coalitions
   - Increased legitimacy of government and more political stability because
   of truer “majority rule”
   - Smaller gap between what voters want and politicians do
   - Reduced social conflict
   - Less corruption
   - Reduced government costs
   - Wiser use of tax dollars and natural resources
   - Increases in widespread economic prosperity arising from increased
   fairness



Unfairness of plurality voting
Plurality voting is a bad method that is used far too often.

We use the term "plurality" voting to refer to the commonly used counting
method in which each voter marks only a single choice on the ballot, the
number of marks for each candidate are counted, and the candidate with the
most marks is regarded as the winner. In some nations this method is called
"First Past The Post" (and abbreviated FPTP or FPP).

Although plurality voting produces fair results when there are only two
candidates, the results are often dramatically unfair when this method is
used in elections with three or more candidates.

"Vote splitting" is a key weakness of plurality voting, so it is worth
understanding. Vote splitting refers to similar candidates each receiving
fewer votes compared to a single opposition candidate, in situations where
either similar candidate alone would win over the opposition candidate. It
accounts for why, in most democracies, each political party elects a single
candidate for each election. If a political party offers two candidates,
both of those candidates are likely to lose to a party that offers only one
candidate. This happens because that party's voters split their votes
between the two candidates, while the winning party concentrates all of
their voters' votes on a single candidate. In other words, plurality-based
elections often result in the wrong candidate winning.

If voters try to compensate by only voting for either of the two clearly
popular choices, the typical result is a two-party system. This narrows the
scope of debate and reduces voter choice. With fewer choices it becomes
easier for incumbents to become complacent and even corrupt. In a two-party
system, additional political parties do not have a fair chance to
demonstrate their true support unless other election methods, such as ones
explained below, accommodate them. Of course a party without majority
support should not win, but neither should it face artificial obstacles that
prevent voters from expressing support.

In spite of its well-known weaknesses, plurality voting is far too widely
used, especially in the English-speaking world. Often, it seems to be
working well, because the system hides its own flaws. But the undercurrent
of dissatisfaction and the wide gap between citizens and government saps the
strength of the democracy. And there is a constant risk that the next result
could be disastrously spoiled by vote-splitting.
Better ballots
With better information from the voters, we can elect better winners.
Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting —
which in this declaration is called a "single-mark” ballot — is not
appropriate in governmental elections. Its deficiency is that it does not
collect enough preference information from the voters in order to always
correctly identify the most popular candidate when there are more than two
candidates.

There are three kinds of ballots that collect enough preference information
to always, or almost always, correctly identify the most popular candidate.
The names and descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order:

   - Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the voter
   approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates who are
   not acceptable



   - Ranked ballot (or “1-2-3 ballot”), on which a voter indicates a first
   choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and optionally indicates
   additional choices at lower preference levels



   - Score ballot, on which a voter assigns a number or grade for each
   candidate. The most familiar versions of such voting are to rate something
   with 1 to 5 stars, or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, or to rate
   each choice at a named grade (such as "excellent", "good", "fair", "poor",
   or "reject"), but any range of numbers or grades can be used.



Why don’t more people understand the unfairness of plurality voting?
Single-mark ballots do not collect enough information to reveal the actual
preferences of voters in elections that have three or more reasonably
popular candidates. This lack of full preference information makes it
difficult for anyone to produce clear proof, or even evidence, of unfair
election results.

Adopting any of the three better ballot types would provide the information
that is needed for fair results. In addition, comparing the fair results
against who would have won if plurality voting had been used will quickly
reveal the dramatic unfairness of plurality voting.

Fairer counting methods
Together we endorse four voting methods that would give more-democratic
results.

These three better ballot types can be counted in different ways to produce
different results. We, the undersigned election-method experts and
enthusiasts, have both developed and analyzed many counting methods, and we
now agree there are several counting methods that are worth adopting in
governmental elections.

Here, in alphabetical order, are four counting methods that we agree would
produce significantly better results compared to plurality voting, along
with the principal advantage claimed by the advocates of each method:

   - Approval voting, which uses approval ballots and identifies the
   candidate with the most approval marks as the winner.


Advantage: It is the simplest election method to collect preferences (either
on ballots or with a show of hands) and the simplest method (besides
plurality) to count and explain. Its simplicity makes it a good first step
toward any of the other methods.

   - Any of the Condorcet methods, which use ranked ballots, and which use
   "pairwise counting" to count how many voters prefer each candidate compared
   to each other candidate, and which identify as the "Condorcet winner" the
   candidate who is pairwise preferred over each and every other candidate. In
   a few elections there is no Condorcet winner, and different Condorcet
   methods use different rules to resolve such cases, although even then the
   results are often the same. Some good Condorcet methods are:
   Condorcet-Approval, Condorcet-IRV, Condorcet-Kemeny, and Condorcet-Schulze.
   (The word Condorcet is a French name that is pronounced "kon-dor-say".)


Advantage: Condorcet methods provide what many people see as the fairest
results in the common cases where there is a Condorcet winner.

   - Majority judgment, which uses score ballots to collect the fullest
   preference information, and elects the candidate who gets the best score
   from half or more of the voters. More specifically, the best median score
   wins. This system is a form of Bucklin voting, which is a general class of
   methods that has been used for city elections in both 18th-century
   Switzerland and the 20th-century United States.


Advantage: Majority Judgment counts ballots in a way that reduces the
incentives for strategic voting, so it is arguably the best system for
finding out how the voters feel about each candidate on an absolute scale,
not just as better or worse than other candidates.

   - Range voting (also known as score voting), which also uses score
   ballots, and adds together the scores assigned to each candidate, and
   identifies the winner as the candidate who receives the highest total score.


Advantage: Range voting comes closest to the mathematically-defined "best"
overall results for voter satisfaction if voters vote sincerely. It gives
the same reasonable results as Approval voting if every voter votes
strategically.

There is another counting method that is supported by some, but not most, of
the undersigned election-method experts. It is called "instant-runoff
voting" (or "IRV" or "the alternative vote"), and it uses ranked ballots.
The counting method begins by considering each voter's highest-ranked
choice, and eliminating the candidate with the fewest votes, and then
shifting the affected ballots to the next-most preferred candidate, and
repeating this process until a candidate receives a majority of votes. The
main advantage of instant-runoff counting is that it is easy for many people
to understand, especially because the counting process is similar to the
familiar process of runoff elections.

Instant-runoff voting is used in some governmental elections throughout the
world, and most of us agree that usually the results are an improvement over
plurality voting. However, many of us either regard the degree of
improvement as not being significant enough to justify adopting this method,
or are concerned that its not-always-fair results will be associated with
ranked ballots rather than with the instant-runoff counting method.

Significantly some of the places that have adopted instant-runoff voting
have later rejected the method and returned to plurality voting. In the
United States, these places include Aspen, Colorado and Burlington, Vermont.
The rejections occurred because the official IRV winner was not the same as
the Condorcet winner.

Advocates of instant-runoff counting point out that IRV has an advantageous
voting characteristic that is missing from any of our supported counting
methods. This characteristic (which is called “Later No Harm”) is that it
does not give any advantage to voters who use a voting strategy of not
ranking all the candidates. Although some of us agree that “Later No Harm”
is a desirable characteristic, none of us think that it is necessary, or
that the systems endorsed here are unacceptable for lacking it. Even in a
system without this characteristic, enough voters will mark an extra
approved candidate (on an approval ballot) or lower preferences (on a ranked
or score ballot) to improve over the Plurality results. After all, under
plurality voting many voters go even further than that, demonstrating a
willingness to “betray” their true favorite by casting a strategic vote for
a “lesser evil”.

Most of us agree that the two advantages of IRV do not outweigh its major
disadvantage, which is that it fails to correctly identify the most popular
candidate in many elections.

Looking into the future, there may be additional, newly developed methods
that we support in the future, but they require further analysis. One such
election method that shows promise is Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval
(SODA) voting, which combines approval voting with vote delegation to make
the voter’s task as simple as possible.

The choice of counting method determines which kind of ballot is needed.
Each of the ballot types can be implemented on paper ballots, and these
ballots can be scanned optically and counted by computer. All the ballot
types also can be counted manually if needed, which is significant because
most of us also support making government elections trustworthy through the
use of voter-verifiable paper ballots.

To appreciate the importance of the few election methods we support,
consider that there are many other election methods and voting methods, plus
combinations of them, that we do not endorse. In fact, for some of them we
unanimously agree to oppose their use in governmental elections.

Why do we not support a single "best" election method? Different
election-method experts place different degrees of importance on the
relative advantages and disadvantages of each method. In the list of
signatures some of us indicate which voting method we most-strongly prefer.
It bears repeating, though, that despite our disagreements, we would not
hesitate to support any of these methods over plurality voting.

The following Wikipedia articles provide detailed descriptions and
characteristics of our supported methods:

   - Approval voting
   - Condorcet method
   - Majority Judgment
   - Range voting



Some of us signing this statement edit these Wikipedia articles to keep them
accurate and unbiased. Also, many of us participate in the
"Election-Methods" forum at www.electorama.com/em, and we would be happy to
answer your questions about any of these methods.
Additional considerations
Proportional representation
Legislatures should represent all the voters, not just a bare majority.

So far, all of the above recommendations apply to identifying a single
winner, so they are known as "single-winner" election methods. These
single-winner methods are ideally suited for electing mayors and governors.
When used in non-governmental organizations, these single-winner methods are
ideally suited for electing a president, treasurer, and secretary.

Different considerations apply if an election fills a legislative seat, such
as a seat in a legislature, congress, or parliament. In Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, the typical method for filling a legislative
seat is to define a district or riding in which plurality voting is used to
elect one person who is expected to represent the citizens in that district
or riding.

All of us signing this declaration agree that plurality voting is not
acceptable as an election method for filling a single district-based or
riding-based legislative seat. All of us would support using any of the
single-winner methods endorsed above, as an improvement over using plurality
voting to fill a district-based or riding-based legislative seat.

Most of us agree that an even better choice would be to adopt an election
method in which the choice of who wins one legislative seat interacts with
who wins another equivalent seat in ways that give at least somewhat
proportional representation to most voters.

The best-known approach, which is used in many countries in Europe and
elsewhere, is party-based proportional representation. Such methods ask
voters to indicate their favorite political party, and then make adjustments
to ensure that the percentage of legislative seats filled by members of each
party roughly matches the percentage of voters who support each party. In
other words, if 15% of the voters marked the Silver Party as their favorite,
then approximately 15% of the parliamentary seats would be filled by Silver
Party politicians.

Proportional representation provides a number of advantages that we agree
are important, including:

   - The legislature better reflects the makeup of the population.
   - It essentially eliminates the effects of "gerrymandering," which is a
   political manipulation of district or riding boundaries for the purpose of
   favoring a specific political party or incumbent.
   - Without proportional representation, gerrymandering and other factors
   can lead to more than 90% of officeholders being re-elected, and as many as
   98% in some cases. These foregone conclusions reduce turnout.
   - Effective proportional representation ensures representation for almost
   all voters, rather than just slightly more than half, in that their votes
   end up helping some representative win.



Almost all of us agree that where proportional representation (PR) is used,
the "open-list" versions or the “candidate-centric” versions, not the
"closed-list" versions, should be used. We oppose the closed-list versions
because they disregard candidate-specific voter preferences, and transfer
power to people who are not elected, and who cannot easily be removed from
their position of power.

There are many good versions of proportional representation, but we are not
yet expressing support for any specific version because the best choice
depends on the situation and goals.

Using the fairer methods in organizations
Private organizations are a great place to start voting reform.

These better voting methods are not just useful for public elections. They
also can be used to elect a private organization's officers, to elect
corporate board members, to make voting-based group decisions, and to elect
delegates to political-party conventions. In addition to increasing the
fairness of such elections and decisions, these uses will increase the
number of people who realize that plurality voting is very unfair, and help
them learn how to achieve much fairer results.

Keep in mind that all four of our recommended election methods already have
been used to elect officers in non-governmental organizations, and the
fairer results have been widely appreciated (except by some incumbents who
were not reelected).

If an organization uses rules that require plurality voting, or follows
Roberts Rules of Order, we encourage the organization to amend its rules to
accommodate one or more of our supported election methods. If the
organization cannot decide which method to adopt, the revised rules can
allow the presiding organization's officers to choose which of our supported
methods will be used in the next election.

Our recommended election methods also can be used by any group of people to
make single-choice decisions, such as choosing a new logo, choosing a time
or date for an event, and choosing a restaurant for a gathering.

The nomination process of a political party can use any of our supported
voting methods to better identify the candidates who are really the
strongest, and therefore have the best chance of winning the election. This
fairer primary-nomination process may reduce intra-party attacks, increase
party unity, attract more voters, and boost enthusiasm for the party’s
nominees.

Multiple rounds of voting
Good voting methods can reduce the need for primaries and runoffs, or give
even-better results when combined with such extra rounds.

Current elections commonly use multiple rounds of voting. This includes both
“primary elections” to narrow the number of choices prior to the main vote,
and second-round “runoff elections” to ensure a majority if one is not
obtained in the main first round.

These extra rounds, which can serve several purposes, are essential with
plurality voting because that method only really works when there are just
two main candidates.

Some of us believe that improved voting methods require only one round of
voting. Others of us believe that multiple rounds are still useful because
they serve to focus attention on the candidates in the runoff round, without
distraction from the less-popular candidates. Yet all of us agree that
plurality voting should never be used in any round with more than two
candidates.

When choosing which candidates deserve to progress to a runoff election, we
do not offer specific recommendations for interpreting results – beyond
obviously including the most popular candidate. There are various
possibilities for how to choose the second, third, and additional
candidates, and the best approach would depend on which of our supported
methods is used (in the earlier round), and other details. This issue is
similar to the question of how to increase proportional representation.

Regardless of whether our supported election methods are used with or
without runoff elections, the results will be much fairer than what can be
achieved using plurality voting with multiple voting rounds.

Separate reforms

Reforming the voting system helps with other democratic reforms.

Nothing in this statement should be interpreted to imply that we believe
that election-method reform is the only area of existing political systems
that currently needs reform. In fact, most of us also support other reforms
such as broader campaign-finance-reporting rules, increased use of other
decision-making aids such as deliberative polling, and clearer ethics rules
for officeholders. We believe that the election-method reforms we advocate
here would be synergistic with such other reforms, both in terms of easing
their adoption and multiplying their beneficial effects.

Benefits for all
Voting reform is truly a win/win solution that will help all political
groups.

We, as election-method experts and enthusiasts, have spent the last decade
developing online resources about election methods, developing software for
the election methods we support, and now we have reached agreement as to
which election methods are worth adopting as replacements for plurality
voting. Through this declaration we are sharing our recommendations. We also
offer to share our deep understanding of election methods with policymakers
and politically active citizens of any nation, state, province,
municipality, or political party.

Those of us signing this declaration proudly stand at widely separate points
on the political spectrum. When we vote, we know that many of us will be
strongly supporting opposite sides. And even in discussing voting systems,
we have our disagreements. Yet we respect each other’s common interests in
wanting to move beyond plurality voting in search of a healthier democracy.
In signing this statement, and in supporting a variety of different methods,
we are looking beyond narrow, partisan interests. We seek to support the
common good. In fact we are unanimous in sincerely believing there are no
good reasons to oppose election-method reform.

Politics is often viewed as a “zero-sum game” in which one side can gain
only if another side loses. In contrast, we view election-method reform as
taking the next step up the ladder of democracy; just as democracy has
proven to be much better than dictatorships, higher levels of democracy will
help us reach even higher standards of living for almost everyone. We do not
pretend to offer a utopia, where conflicts of interest disappear and
everyone is a winner. We simply believe that even a political group that
loses an election can benefit from healthier dialogue and elected officials
who better represent the voters.

Thus, we believe that better election methods will help all political
groups: both left and right, both business and labor, both incumbents and
upstart campaigners, both centrists and extremists. Even special interests
who currently donate large campaign contributions will benefit from a more
robust and sustainable economy. And most politicians will appreciate it if
we cut the puppet strings that connect them to their biggest campaign
contributors. We believe that every political group can benefit in very
concrete and specific ways, and we are available to discuss how and why for
each case.

Taking action

Here is what you can do to help reform voting methods.

We address this statement to all citizens, and especially to those who are
aware of any of the many benefits that election-method reforms will bring.
To people in specific situations we offer the following words of
encouragement:

   - If you are a policymaker, you can reduce the negative attacks and the
   need to constantly fundraise. We strongly urge you to introduce legislation
   that would adopt one of the election methods we support.
   - If you are active in a political party that uses plurality voting, you
   can increase your party’s chances of winning in the main election by
   nominating more-electable candidates in a way that encourages participation
   and debate, not unproductive conflict. We strongly urge you to encourage the
   use of a better voting method to choose your party's candidates and your
   party's internally elected delegates.
   - If you feel that “your” political party wants your vote and your money,
   but doesn’t care about your political priorities, there is a way for your
   favorite issues to get the attention they deserve. We strongly urge you to
   tell those who share your political views how the fairer election methods
   supported in this declaration can help you come together as a force to be
   reckoned with, while still cooperating with other groups to fight against
   ideas you consider dangerous.
   - If you don’t identify with any of the main political parties, there is
   a way you can start to have real choices at the ballot box. We strongly urge
   you to learn about one or more of the election methods we support, and then
   tell others what you have learned.
   - If you are a member of an organization that elects officers using
   plurality voting, this is a chance to help your organization run more
   smoothly. We strongly urge you to advocate using one of the recommended
   election methods when an election involves more than two candidates.



At the very least, please help the world by eliminating the primitive voting
method known as plurality voting.
The highest priority of this declaration is to stop the use of plurality
voting in governmental elections, which should always accommodate more than
two candidates. The widespread availability of computers now makes it easy
to adopt any of the better election methods we support.

Finally, please educate others that if voters can only indicate a single,
first choice on their ballot, then the choice with the most plurality votes
is not necessarily the most popular, and the choice with the fewest
plurality votes is not necessarily the least popular.

We, the following election-method experts and enthusiasts, agree with the
statements made in this declaration.




Responses to DK's comments below:

2011/9/5 Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
>
> I finally got around to a bit.
> I see both Judgment and Judgement - can one be a typo?

"Judgment" is how B+L, the method proposers, spell it. Fixed.

>
> Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
> Contents
>
> When there is a list of items, some taking more than one line, something,
such as indentation, should show start of each item.

That's good now, I'm not sure what you were seeing.

> I see Enthusiasts here - Should also go with Experts below.

Fixed.

>
> Introduction
> It is time to change our voting system.
>
> We, the undersigned election-method experts and enthusiasts from around
the world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in elections in
which there are more than two candidates. In this declaration we offer
several ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will
reliably produce much fairer results.
>
> Proper question is whether there MAY be more than two candidates:
> .     There will never be more than two - so election method does not
matter.
> .     When there are more, voters can wish to vote against the worst by
voting for more than one - impossible with plurality.
> .     We cannot be bothered with this need - how bad this is depends on
value of the election.
> Part of selling against plurality:
> .     Wherever current experience is that runoffs are rarely needed and
there is very little voting for other than the two main candidates, deciders
may feel that there is no need for preparing for what has never happened to
them.
> .     Even with that normality, there can be times when voting for others
happens in significant numbers.  We need to alert deciders that this can
happen in any district and this is what needs preparing for even if they are
used to things staying simpler.

I think I've integrated your ideas.

>
> Better ballots
> With better information from the voters, we can find better winners.
>
> Approval gives nothing but ability to vote for more than one.
> All the others provide for voters indicating which of the candidates they
vote for are also their most preferred.
> Also, while Condorcet ranking unconditionally says that higher ranks are
better than lower, there is nothing requiring or permitting saying how much
higher.
> The other methods, depending on statements as to how much higher a ranked
candidate may be, require that the voter indicate magnitude in the vote.
>
> Fairer counting methods
>
> Condorcet:
> .     It is an approach to a tie that CAN result in those leading
candidates needing some extra analysis to decide on a winner.
> .     The n*n matrix used in Condorcet has information useful to those
wanting to learn more about relationship of candidates.
>
> There are three Condorcet methods that identify the Condorcet winner (when
there is one) without explicitly looking for the Condorcet winner, and they
are, in alphabetical order:
>
> I claim that, if there is one, the CW should be found and, at our
distance, we do not need to check on how the method goes about that.
> Even if there is no CW, the n*n matrix used to look for the CW is the
obvious source for deciding on a winner - which points toward using n*n for
this analysis.
> I have not chased down the innards of using IRV here, but wonder if, as
used here, it is immune to the problems that afflicted IRV in  Burlington.
> Anyway, I ask that IRV discussion stay out of the Condorcet discussion -
seems like there were, earlier, better words about IRV than I see here.
> Also, seems like SODA should be kept away from Condorcet.
>
> In
>
> Using the fairer methods in organizations
> Private organizations are a great place to start voting reform.
>
>
> One particularly relevant example of a “private” election is the
nomination process of a political party. It is true that our supported
methods make this process less important, because, unlike plurality, they do
not break down when more than one candidate from a party is running. Still,
we expect that many parties would still want to have a formal nomination
(“primary election”) process so as to focus their efforts on one or two
candidates per office. We believe that any party using a superior voting
system internally will see immediate benefits. A primary process with
increased turnout, with fewer negative attacks, and with a more-democratic
result will result in a stronger nominee who is better-prepared to win in
the general election.
>
> This presumably is true in some states.  In New York parties do not do
elections.  Primaries, done by government for the parties, handle both
primary elections AND electing party officers.

We don't mention that; I think the statement should remain general.

JQ
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