[EM] [CES #3834] condorcet & range voting -- which one yields more condorcet winners?

[Jameson Quinn]

Note that the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" is only true for Range if
voters are strategic *and somewhat knowledgeable about the polls*. It is
true for Majority Judgment under the same conditions, but also when any
fraction of voters are honest and ideology is one dimensional; I believe
that it holds for N dimensions but I have not proven it. It is true for SODA
if most voters agree with their candidate's rankings. I believe that these
conditions for MJ and SODA are broader than the conditions for Range.

Jameson

2011/10/11 Warren Smith <warren.wds at gmail.com>

> R.Bristow-Johnson complained about a claim made by Clay Shentrup
> that range voting can elect more Condorcet winners than Condorcet methods.
> This sounds insane, but arises if the voters are STRATEGIC.
>
> Then, Condorcet voting can fail to elect (what would have been with
> honest votes) a Condorcet winner.
> Meanwhile range voting with strategic voters can elect him.
> I've done sim experiments indicating that range voting finds
> honest-voter Condorcet winners
> more often than Condorcet methods do, if the voters are strategic. See:
>
> http://www.rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html
>
> for the details
>
> --
> Warren D. Smith
> http://RangeVoting.org  <-- add your endorsement (by clicking
> "endorse" as 1st step)
>
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