[EM] A new criterion: The Co-operation/Defection Criterion

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/10/25 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>

>
>
> Juho--
>
> Yes, i should suggest the strategy-informing poll idea to progressive small
> parties and organizations. I'll be doing
> that.
>
> It could take a long time to get a new voting system, even locally. And
> even longer nationally. But, with honest and
> genuinely well-intentioned polling, we could _effectively_ have a better
> voting system right now.
>
> Plurality will be around for a long time, but effectively we can have
> Condorcet for 2012.
>
> Kevin--
>
> I want to re-emphasize my answer to your question:
>
> Most definitely! It's better to elect a weak candidate than one with a
> larger pairwise opposition, due to
> how it affects defensive strategy need and dilemma.
>
>
> Jameson--
>
>
> You wrote:
>
> That looks right. In fact, let's make it more extreme:
>
> 39 C
> 10 C>A
> 21 A>B
> 30 B
>
> According to the criterion as stated, A must win this election. But what if
> the honest preferences are actually:
> 21 A>C
> 10 C>A
> 39 C>B
> 30 B>C
>
> [endquote]
>
>
> If those are the sincere preferences in your example, then your example
> doesn't satisfy
> CD's premise.
>

My point is that there's no way to distinguish those honest preferences,
from the honest preferences which do meet the criterion (that is, as voted
except for B is really B>A).

>
> In your example, C is the Condorcet candidate, and A is the sincere
> Condorcet
> loser. Your example has zero voters preferring A and B to C.
>
> CD's premise stipulates that A is the Condorcet candidate and that there is
> a
> majority who prefer A and B to everyone else.
>
> So CD says nothing about what should happen, who should win, in that
> example.
>

Yes it does, because as far as it can tell, those votes could come from
honest preferences which fall under the criterion.


>
> In your example, the A voters are reversing a preference, another violation
> of
> CD's premise stipulations.
>
> I'll take a look at the way your ballots derive from your sincere rankings.
> It isn't
> a CB example, but I'll check out the plausibility and badness of it as an
> MMPO example.
>
>
> You wrote:
>
>
> Moreover, even without this loophole, I just don't like how that first
> election looks.
>
> What first election? Are you referring to your voted ballots?
>

Yes. What I meant was, even if those voted ballots reflect sincere
preferences which meet the criterion, I would not be at all sure that A is
the correct winner, as the criterion says they must be.


>
> A, with 31 votes total, the lowest of any candidate, wins?
>
> The only 1st choice B or C voters who expressed a choice between A and the
> alternative preferred A.
>
> I
> just can't imagine trying to convince people that that's the right answer.
> If there were more than three people in the room, you wouldn't get 5 words
> out before they started laughing and interrupting you with sarcasm.
>
> [endquote]
>
> You're saying that people will reject any voting system that doesn't uphold
> Plurality's standard. If you're right, then we can forget about replacing
> Plurality.
>

No, I'm saying that if you overrule plurality, you should at least have some
plausible reason to do so; and "plausible" implies, for instance, one that
doesn't rely on inferring preferences which are not visible in the voted
ballots.


>
> You wrote:
>
> So, the only way to meet this criterion, is to never have the situation
> happen in the first place. It sounds impossible. Unless...
>
> [endquote]
>
> ??? The situation you describe doesn't satisfy CD's premise stipulations.
>

Yes it does. The voted ballots could come from a CD scenario, and a system
has no way to distinguish if they don't.


> Delegation proposals like SODA have been around for a very long time.
> They've
> been independently re-invented many times.
>

Of course. I don't see what you're trying to say.

But note that SODA also has a delegation order which helps resolve this
situation; this is a feature which I have not seen elsewhere.


> It would be one way of getting rid of defensive strategy problems, as well
> as a 2nd
> election, but cheaper. But maybe illegal,


On what basis? Sounds like FUD.

maybe unconstitutional,


????!!!! You're talking about the US constitution? The one that allowed
appointed senators (until the 17th amendment) and still would allow at-large
representatives or representatives from unequal-sized districts? Exactly
where in "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Place of Chusing Senators" (or even "The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government") is the nature of a vote defined? Sorry, no way.

and most likely
> would sound undemocratic to people


SODA delegation is 100% optional. If you don't like the pre-announced
preference order, don't delegate. Very simple. If there's anything
undemocratic here, it's you telling me that I can't delegate even if I want
to, not me telling you that you can if you want to.

and would be rejected by the public.
>

Could be. I think not.

Cheers,
Jameson
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