[EM] A new criterion: The Co-operation/Defection Criterion

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Juho--
 
Yes, i should suggest the strategy-informing poll idea to progressive small parties and organizations. I'll be doing
that.
 
It could take a long time to get a new voting system, even locally. And even longer nationally. But, with honest and
genuinely well-intentioned polling, we could _effectively_ have a better voting system right now. 
 
Plurality will be around for a long time, but effectively we can have Condorcet for 2012.
 
Kevin--
 
I want to re-emphasize my answer to your question:
 
Most definitely! It's better to elect a weak candidate than one with a larger pairwise opposition, due to
how it affects defensive strategy need and dilemma.
 
 
Jameson--
 

You wrote:

That looks right. In fact, let's make it more extreme:

39 C
10 C>A
21 A>B
30 B

According to the criterion as stated, A must win this election. But what if
the honest preferences are actually:
21 A>C
10 C>A
39 C>B
30 B>C

[endquote]
 
 
If those are the sincere preferences in your example, then your example doesn't satisfy
CD's premise. 
 
In your example, C is the Condorcet candidate, and A is the sincere Condorcet
loser. Your example has zero voters preferring A and B to C. 
 
CD's premise stipulates that A is the Condorcet candidate and that there is a
majority who prefer A and B to everyone else.
 
So CD says nothing about what should happen, who should win, in that example.
 
In your example, the A voters are reversing a preference, another violation of
CD's premise stipulations.
 
I'll take a look at the way your ballots derive from your sincere rankings. It isn't
a CB example, but I'll check out the plausibility and badness of it as an MMPO example.
 
 
You wrote:


Moreover, even without this loophole, I just don't like how that first
election looks. 
 
What first election? Are you referring to your voted ballots?
 
A, with 31 votes total, the lowest of any candidate, wins? 
 
The only 1st choice B or C voters who expressed a choice between A and the
alternative preferred A.
 
I
just can't imagine trying to convince people that that's the right answer.
If there were more than three people in the room, you wouldn't get 5 words
out before they started laughing and interrupting you with sarcasm.
 
[endquote]
 
You're saying that people will reject any voting system that doesn't uphold
Plurality's standard. If you're right, then we can forget about replacing Plurality.
 
You wrote:

So, the only way to meet this criterion, is to never have the situation
happen in the first place. It sounds impossible. Unless...

[endquote]
 
??? The situation you describe doesn't satisfy CD's premise stipulations.
 
Delegation proposals like SODA have been around for a very long time. They've
been independently re-invented many times.
 
It would be one way of getting rid of defensive strategy problems, as well as a 2nd
election, but cheaper. But maybe illegal, maybe unconstitutional, and most likely
would sound undemocratic to people and would be rejected by the public.

Mike Ossipoff