[EM] Comments on the declaration and on a few voting systems

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Mike,
 
Nice to see you back.

--- En date de : Ven 14.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com> a écrit :





> Venzke's MMPO example

> 9999 A > B = C
>    1 A = C > B
>   1 B = C > A
> 9999 B > A = C
.
> and C wins. That seems quite counterintuitive.
.
.
Yes. C is the Condorcet loser.
 
But is Kevin sure that C wins in that example?
 
MMPO isn't usually defined as a Condorcet method, though it is very nearly one.
>From the criteria standpoint, MMPO was attractive because it satisfied weak FBC
as well as Later-no-harm. It also satisfies SFC, and in the three-candidate case,
it won't fail SDSC.
 
I think there are two main bad things about the basic method:
1. The Plurality criterion failure (which is on display above)
2. Although it satisfies LNHarm, the defensive truncation strategy is still viable and
recommended (by me, anyway).
 
Kevin
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