[EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/11/27 matt welland <matt at kiatoa.com>

> On Sat, 2011-11-26 at 22:31 -0500, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> > On 11/26/11 6:58 PM, matt welland wrote:
>
> > > Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
> > they don't know anything about Approval (or Score or Borda or Bucklin or
> > Condorcet) despite some effort by me to illustrate it regarding the
> > state senate race in our county.
>
> I wasn't clear. I want to hear opinions from the list: Is approval
> better or worse than IRV and why?
>

I consider Approval to be better than IRV. Consider the case of Burlington,
which I think well-illustrates the flaws of both. Approval could easily
have failed in Burlington. Assuming most Republicans bullet voted (which is
probably strategically smart), then there would be a chicken dilemma for
the Democratic and Progressive voters. They could bullet vote and risk
electing the Republican, or approve 2 and give up their voice in the choice
between D and P. So in theory any of the three candidates could win.

In that sense, Approval is as bad or worse than IRV. But then look at how
people would react (if the system were un-repealable). In Approval, people
could adjust their vote until they got a result they liked better. The
eventual strategic equilibrium would be that the CW would tend to win. In
IRV, however, there's no way to change the result without voting
dishonestly. So you'd either be stuck with progressives winning, or people
would start to use two-party-lesser-evil strategy, and you'd get a
two-power lock on power as in plurality. I consider the corrupt,
non-competitive nature of either of these long-term results to be far worse
than a single "spoiled" election.

Jameson
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