[EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.

[Dave Ketchum]

On Nov 24, 2011, at 3:50 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> On 11/24/11 2:20 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
>> Let me start off by saying that I'm thankful for this list-serve of  
>> people passionate about electoral reform
>> and that you put together a working consensus statement.  I'm  
>> trying to work it some more...
>>
>> My belief is that the US's system makes it necessary to frame  
>> electoral reform simply and to limit the options proffered.
>
> but they should be *good* options.  limiting the proffered options  
> to IRV is proven by our experience in Vermont to eventually fail.

That justifies promoting Condorcet - see below.  Others deserve  
arguing against:
      FPTP- can only vote for one - why we are considering what to  
promote.
      Approval - can vote for more, but does not support expressing  
unequal liking.
      Range/score - demands expressing (in an amount understandable)  
how much better one candidate is than another.
      IRV or IRV3 - good voting, but counting does not promise to be  
complete (see Burlington).
      PR - that deserves promoting for such as legislators - but here  
we are thinking of electing single officers such as mayors and  
governors.
>
>>  This is what FairVote does and they do it well.
>
> no they don't.  FairVote sells ranked-choice voting and the IRV/STV  
> method of tabulating the ranked ballots as if they are the same  
> thing.  i.e., once they convince voters, city councilors, and  
> legislators that ranked-choice voting is a good thing (by accurately  
> pointing out what is wrong with FPTP in a multiparty context and/or  
> viable independent candidates), they present IRV as it is the only  
> solution.  that backfired BIG TIME here in Burlington Vermont.
>
>>  If you're going to undercut their marketing strategy then  
>> ethically the burden of proof is on you wrt providing a clear-cut  
>> alternative to IRV3.
>
> Condorcet.
>
> which Condorcet method i am not so particular about, but simplicity  
> is good.  Schulze may be the best from a functional POV (resistance  
> to strategy) but, while i have a lot of respect for Markus, the  
> Schulze method appears complicated and will be a hard sell.  i also  
> do not think that cycles will be common in governmental elections  
> and am convinced that when a cycle rarely occurs, it will never  
> involve more than 3 candidates in the Smith set.  given a bunch of  
> Condorcet-compliant methods that all pick the same winner in the 3- 
> candidate Smith set, the simplest method should be the one marketed  
> to the public and to legislators.

The ranking offers a bit of power that is easy to express - rank as  
many candidates as you approve of, showing for each pair whether you  
see them as A>B, A=B, or A<B, but no need to assign a value as to how  
much the better exceeds the weaker (note that ranking a candidate you  
do not approve of risks helping that reject win).
      It is in ranking multiple candidates that we lead to voting for  
more than two parties for we can vote among those parties plus our  
true desire.

The voting is much like IRV's, except also permitting A=B.  The vote  
counting, unlike IRV's, considers all the ranking you vote.

While you can use as many ranks as the ballot permits, you are not  
required to do more than express your desires - ranking one as in  
FPTP, or more as equal as in Approval, is fine if that expresses your  
thoughts (especially if you only wish the leader to win or lose).

To get a cycle you have to have three or more near tied candidates in  
which each beats at least one of its competitors.  Resolving such  
requires a bit of fairness, but requires little more than that, since  
we got there by being near to ties.
>
>
Dave Ketchum
> --
>
> r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."