[EM] Re : Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics?

[Kevin Venzke]

Jameson/Mike,
 

De : Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>>>À : Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> 
>>>Cc : em <election-methods at electorama.com> 
>>>Envoyé le : Jeudi 17 Novembre 2011 12h48
>>>Objet : Re: [EM] Re : Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>2011/11/17 Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> 
>>>..In practice [preference-mentioning criteria] usually have to be translated into votes-only criteria in order to figure out how to use or test them.
>>>Yes, this is another (better?) way of putting what I said about "Criteria which apply to ballots and mention preferences".
>>>
>>>Jameson
>>>
>>
>>
>> 
>Well, in my mind a votes-only criterion is independent. Usually the two versions aren't quite equivalent or can't be easily proven to be equivalent.
>
>I think part of the disagreement on this issue is based on who the audience is. On this list we don't generally have problems with most people using an implied Woodall-ish conception of methods and criteria. If someone wanted to argue that FPP actually does satisfy Condorcet we would just tell them they're doing it wrong and shrug them off, no big deal. Mike seems to be paranoid about people understanding criteria contrary to their original intention.
>
>The inconvenient thing about e.g. SDSC is mostly the "should have a way of voting" wording. In practice this "way of voting" is almost always truncation (which definitely is possible to define within Mike's scheme, as he doesn't consider truncation of two candidates to be voting them equal). Mike's wording does allow a method to satisfy the criterion alternatively using an explicit approval cutoff or something. So I recognize that he is getting something additional, that is not useless, from his choice of wording.
>
>I wonder if SDSC can really be seamlessly applied to any ballot format though. Mike seems to assume it is unambiguous what it means to vote a candidate above or equal to or below another candidate. If he has a definition for these I imagine it's based on some very specific test that wouldn't necessarily reflect general method behavior. For example, what if under some method the majority preferring A to B can make B lose by ranking B top? One could say (see definition below) that this is no good, because B is being ranked "over" A. But how do we know whether that's "over"? Based on this one very counterintuitive result, it doesn't look like "over."
>
>What if voters can vote cycles? What if they put candidates in color-coded buckets and the outcome is determined by even vs. odd vote counts? I think at some point, any criterion scheme has to say "use your head, you know what I'm trying to say," and where it says that is mostly a matter of taste.
>
>For reference, this is SDSC:
>If a majority of all the voters prefer A to B, then they should have a way of voting that will ensure that B won't win, without any member of that majority voting a less-liked candidate equal to or over a more-liked candidate.
>
>Kevin
>
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