[EM] Replies to two postings from Jameson Quinn

[Jameson Quinn]

>
>
> 4. Allow candidate C to choose whether A or B is elected. (The SODA
> solution)
>
> [endquote]
>
> So you're saying to let the election be decided by a faction who has a
> majority defeat.
> No thanks.
>

Yes, that's right. Candidate C should get only one vote, just like everyone
else:

48999: C
1: C=A
27000: A>B
24000: B(>A sincere)

Or:

48999: C
1: C=B
27000: A>B
24000: B(>A sincere)

Who wins MMPO in the above scenarios?


> And there is no way that the public, in any jurisdiction, will agree to
> let the method rules
> automatically give that decision to a candidate. What are you mixing in
> your soda?


The way SODA does this is not to arbitrarily let C decide. If C voters all
approved C, but did not delegate their votes, C can do nothing. If C
pre-approved B, then C can do nothing; C doesn't delegate, then A assigns
delegated votes to B to prevent C from winning, and B wins. But if C
pre-approved A, or if C truncated or otherwise equal-ranked both in their
pre-declarations; assuming C has enough delegated votes to cover the margin
between A and C (a bit less than half of C's votes); then C has the first
option of assigning delegated votes to A, the candidate with the most
approvals at the time of C's delegation. If C does so, then A wins. If C
does not, then A will assign to B and B will win.

I believe that, just like the pseudo-equivalent MMPO scenarios above, this
is a fair way to resolve the problem. I believe that the fact that the
problem has a solution, will prevent it from arising; that is, B will have
a motive not to insincerely truncate, as they'd rather let the voters
decide the close A/B race than hand that decision to the enemy C. I also
think that your confidence that voters will reject this solution (which is
not arbitrary, but follows the logic of delegation, and in fact is
avoidable by either the voters or the candidates if they don't like it) is
baseless. Personally, I think that the voters would welcome being told that
there's no reason you wouldn't want to delegate to a candidate you agree
with.

Certainly it is the only method I know of where C does not win, and the C
faction can express an A/B preference which affects the result but does not
hurt C's chances to win in the case where the A and B factions sincerely
truncate each other.

Jameson
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