[EM] Addenda: Who is wronged in MMPO bad-example? MCA protection of top-ratred from middle-rated. 3-Slot SFC. The 100, 15, 0 utility example.

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at lavabit.com
Wed Nov 16 09:38:13 PST 2011


MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> Who is wronged in Kevin's MMPO bad-example? 
> -------------------------------------------
> 
> Yesterday I asked how bad C can be, in that example, if nearly all
> the A voters are indifferent between B and C, and the only one not
> indifferent prefers C to B.
> 
> I'd like to additionally ask who is wronged in that example. Someone
> who is indifferent between the winner and the other top candidate?
> Hardly.
> 
> Surely the "wrongness" of a result must be judged by whether or not
> someone is wronged by it.
> 
> Kevin's MMPO bad-example, MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump failure, are
> Plurality-prejudice aesthetic matters. 

If some candidate gets more first place votes than another candidate 
gets any place votes, it seems only reasonable to not elect the latter. 
Call it aesthetic if you want, but anything that breaks it that 
flagrantly will seem really unintuitive to the voters.

I'm not saying the FPTP candidate should win. The "than another 
candidate gets any place votes" part makes absolutely no judgement as to 
  the weights of the voters' preferences, only that first place votes 
have greater value than the equal-at-bottom of truncation.

So you ask who's wronged in the example. I would say that the combined 
group of the A-first and B-first voters are wronged, because you elect a 
candidate that's at the bottom of the entire group's ranks rather than a 
candidate that's at the bottom of only half. Pleasing the two A=C and 
B=C voters is not worth 9999 votes.




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