[EM] Re : Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model

[Kevin Venzke]

Speaking of quoting messages, I have to admit I don't understand how it is even supposed to be done under Yahoo. I can indent the message, and I used to be able to correctly quote plain text messages. But usually when I try to quote an html message I just end up destroying the formatting somehow.
 
Anyway, to Jameson:
 
De : Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
À : kathy.dopp at gmail.com
Cc : EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
Envoyé le : Dimanche 6 Novembre 2011 20h23
Objet : Re: [EM] Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model



> 3. It is therefore reasonable to hope for a voting system that tends to
>> elect centrists, but slightly less so than a Condorcet system.
>
>Why would utility be considered more important than centrist?  Or would it?
>
>
>
Utility is the goal, almost tautologically. I mean yeah, there's plenty of ways you could criticize the model, or even the idea that the votes have anything at all to do with the utility that the voters will gain from a given candidate winning; but until someone comes up with something better, for democracy at least, utility is the best paradigm we have.



I don't think I agree. Utilities are everpresent in simulations because they are a convenient way to represent the priorities of the voters. They can easily be generated from distances in space. But, it's not obvious that these priorities need to be aggregable (we could use a system where the "addition" of different voters' priorities isn't even a straightforward task) and it's not obvious that maximizing the aggregation should even be a goal. You don't need to do it. I've said before that I prefer to look at sincere Condorcet efficiency and strategic incentives. So you don't get one clean number from me, sorry. But I think it may be less artificial than aggregated utility.

Furthermore I doubt that aggregate utility is likely to get you anywhere unique. Electorates in practice try to get sincere CWs elected. If someone ever pointed to a simulation and a scenario and a rule and said, "here is a concrete method by which we can favor higher utility candidates over sincere Condorcet efficiency" my intuition would be that their tools are underestimating the voters. When the sincere CW loses, it represents an error from the standpoint of what the electorate was trying to do. I think it would take some genius work to capitalize consistently on such errors, and gain more than is lost.

All that said, I would be interested to hear if someone has made an argument that majority rule, as a sensible principle, depends on some other more fundamental principle.

Kevin
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