[EM] Burlington manifesto

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Jameson Quinn wrote:

> Condorcet*: Elects center with honesty? Yes; 10/10
> Doesn't elect Condorcet loser, even with strategy? Usually not, though 
> it is in theory possible for the L voters to shoot themselves in the 
> foot by strategically provoking a L>R>C>L cycle but end up electing R 
> thereby. SInce this is pretty implausible, I'll give Condorcet systems 
> 5/5 here.
> Could elect pairwise winner of extremes if Center is inherently weak? No 
> way. 0/5
> Total quality: 15/20

Do you think a hybrid cardinal/Condorcet method could avoid a weak 
Center, or would it have to fail the (rank-based) Condorcet criterion in 
order to do so?