[EM] Jameson: MMT, MTAOC, MJ

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Jameson--

You had said:


Majority

 Judgment has similar advantages to MTA in this case.



[endquote]



I asked:

Does it? Who knows? 
You replied:

Anyone who takes the time to read the academic literature.

[endquote]

Translation: You yourself don't know the answer. 

MJ's advocates are peculiarly reticent about its specific properties, advantages and criterion-compliances.

Alright, I'll answer it for you. MJ does not have advantages similiar to those of MTA.

 

Have its proponents told what criteria it meets and specifically what guarantees it

offers?



How does it do in the Approval bad-example? 
You answered:

Same
 as MTA. 

[endquote]

Ok, in other words, MJ doesn't pass in the ABE. Thank you.

You continued:

That is, honest-votes will reliably give a good result, unlike 
unstable Approval; but strategic voting will lead to failure.

[endquote]

Nonsense. That's a remarkably naive statement. In every nonprobabilistic method, strategy is advantageous.

So you think that you've found one for which that isn't so?  :-)




 (to compare it to MTAOC)



If you're unwilling to research the
 published answers to your own questions, why do you persist in asking 
us to look up your alphabet soup in old posts? For instance, I know what
 you mean by MTAOC (a system with a strong dishonest-fill incentive

[endquote]

In MTAOC, your middle rating of a lesser-evil (B) can't help the lesser-evil beat your favorite (A). And the B-favorite voters reciprocate that middle rating, then it's more likely that one or the
other of those 2 candidates will win, instead of someone (C) less-liked by both factions. If it looks as if that would elect A, then the B voters don't benefit from middle-rating A
unless they sincerely prefer A to C.  Likewise if A and B are reversed in that sentence.

You continued:

, but searching past 
messages for that acronym just gives the written-out name

[endquote]

No, each method's definition was announced in a post whose subject line contained the name of that method, written out,
and, in nearly every case, with the abbreviation in parentheses.



 
What majority-rule guarantees does it offer? Does it meet 3P or 1CM?

You replied:

It meets 3P, which I happen to remember what it means. 

[endquote]

The 3P complying methods that I'm aware of all make two special distinctions, usually a distinction between top rating vs rating below top; and between rating vs not
rating. MJ makes no such distinctions. So, if it meets 3P, then what are the two protection-levels required for 3P compliance?

You continued:

If you define 1CM I'll tell you if it meets that.

[endquote]

Oh, that's ok. _I'll_ tell _you_:  It doesn't. For the reasons stated in my paragraph above.

As I said, I've been meaning to post my definitions in the wikipedia. Lately I haven't had a lot of time for computer. But I'm soon
going to post those definitions.


 
Ok, it doesn't pass in the ABE, and it doesn't pass 3P or 1CM. Well, if we defined a 2P (as compared to 3P), it would pass that, as would Approval
and RV. Maybe there should be a 2P criterion. It probably passes WDSC too, and probably FBC. 





It probably has a strategy situation very much like that of ordinary RV. The method of summed scores.

You replied:

No.
 For most voters in real-world studies of MJ, their honest, 
not-even-normalized MJ ballot was strategically optimal. That is clearly
 far better than Range. 

[endquote]

Oh, that's different! In MJ, some voters don't have incentive to rate other than sincerely :-)   

And the strategizing voters won't affect the outcome?

By the way, if you're going to advocate MJ, it needs a better name. Majority Judgement might be ok as a promotional name, but it is not a descriptive name.
How about (the obvious) "Cardinal Median" or "Median Cardinal".

Mike Ossipoff










 		 	   		  
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