[EM] Paradoxes in Proportional Representation.

[David L Wetzell]

This is based on what I've culled from empirical findings reported in
"Choosing an Electoral System".
<http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/04/choosing-electoral-system-part-i.html>

1. While all forms of PR fall short of proportionality in representation,
the best predictor of proportionality is the number of contested seats.
Yet, PR with fewer seats induces more turnout than PR with a greater
numbers of seats. So the election rule that gives us proportionality tends
to make it so there are fewer competitive seats and less uncertainty about
election outcomes and consequently lower voter participation.

2. Proportionality in representation does not entail proportionality in
power and the latter is desired more than the former. As such, it seems
that minority dissenters will need to use extra-political methods (not
unlike #OWS) to move the center, regardless of whether PR or another mixed
system is used.

3. If both PR and single-seat elections are in use and the latter favors
bigger parties then does PR need to be perfectly proportional or could it
be biased somewhat in favor of smaller parties?  Might not the opposing
biases tend to cancel each other out?

These seem to imply that we need not strive for proportionality in
representation as the gold standard for electoral reform.  If the two major
parties, with a somewhat disproportionate amount of representation, are
more dynamic then they'd tend to represent well the majority of the
population and heed minorities that frame their issues respectfully.
dlw

On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 4:26 PM, <
election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:

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> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>   2. Re: TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) (Jameson Quinn)
>   3. Jameson: Regarding preference criteria (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>   4. TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>   5. Re: Jameson: Regarding preference criteria (Jameson Quinn)
>   6. Re: TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) (Jameson Quinn)
>   7. Jameson: Regarding preference criteria (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 21:15:48 +0000
> Subject: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)
>
>
>
> That would be a big improvement, if FBC, and non-failure in the ABE, can
> be gotten without
> the criticisms that opponents could use against MMPO and MDDTR. Such a
> method would be worth offering
> as a first proposal even if it's a little more complicated than MTA,
> because it's worth
> a try due to its major advantages, whereby no one could think they need to
> bury a favorite, and
> I could vote a not-really-likeable compromise over the worst candidates
> without any strategic hesitation.
> The fact that one isn't giving as much to a non-bottom-ranked candidate
> qualifies more candidates
> as an electoral "lesser-evil", making it easier to defeat greater-evils.
>
>
> Jameson:
>
> You said:
>
> Also, it's not really important
>
> [endquote]
>
> ...but important enough for you to make an issue about?
>
> You continued:
>
>
> , but I've repeatedly pointed out that the
> term "chicken dilemma" is a more descriptive name for this situation, and
> also (as far as I know) one which has precedence.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Take it easy. Call it what you want. I've been referring to it according
> to where I'd
> heard it.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> To: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 15:38:40 -0600
> Subject: Re: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)
>
>>
>> Take it easy. Call it what you want. I've been referring to it according
>> to where I'd
>> heard it.
>
>
> Interesting. Where did you hear it?
>
> Jameson
>
> ps. I still don't know what MTA stands for. I'm sure that there are plenty
> of people who are following this discussion less closely than I am who are
> even more lost in the alphabet soup than I am. I think that putting
> abbreviations on the wiki would be worthwhile.
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 21:41:29 +0000
> Subject: [EM] Jameson: Regarding preference criteria
>
> Jameson:
>
> You said:
>
> Reductio ad absurdem. One voter, two candidates. Preference-based
> criterion: "If the voter votes for A but actually prefers B, then B should
> win".
>
> [endquote]
>
> Remember that you, not I, propose that criterion.
>
> You continue:
>
> But, people say, what if they meant to vote for A? Nope, you say,
> doesn't fit the criterion.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Nonsense. How do you propose to establish that someone preferred the one
> that s/he voted against, especially if s/he denies it?
>
> Your criterion is unusable.
>
> You continue:
>
> So fine, I can find whether system X meets this
> criterion
>
> [endquote]
>
> No, you can't.
>
> That's because you have no way of determinng someone's
> preferences independent of their expression of them.
>
> You continue:
>
> but we can't have a reasonable conversation about it
>
> [endquote]
>
> You got that part right.
>
> You continue:
>
>
> , because
> half of the relevant examples are somehow arbitrarily outlawed because they
> don't "fit".
>
> [endquote]
>
> No, it's because your criterion relies on unavailable information.
>
> You continue:
>
> Preference-mentioning criterion: "Imagine the voter prefers B, but due to
> an epileptic seizure, votes for A. The correct winner in this case would be
> B. Therefore, whenever we see a vote for A, we should elect B."
>
> [endquote]
>
> Again, that's _your_ preference-mentioning criterion. Understand that. I
> agree that
> your criterion is ridiculous.
>
> You continue:
>
>
> I'm
> just saying that a criterion can be justified on the basis of preferences,
> but, like the system itself, must ultimately speak in terms of ballots and
> results.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Hello? I guess it's necessary to repeat this again:
>
> My preference criteria stipulate preferences and relation between
> preferences and
> voting. Thereby, they indirectly stipulate about ballots.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 22:07:34 +0000
> Subject: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)
>
> >> Take it easy. Call it what you want. I've been referring to it
> >>  according to where I'd
> >> heard it.
> >
> > Interesting. Where did you hear it?
>
> In discussion by opponents of Approval.
>
>
> >
>
> > ps. I still don't know what MTA stands for. I'm sure that there are
> > plenty of people who are following this discussion less closely than I
> > am who are even more lost in the alphabet soup than I am. I think that
> > putting abbreviations on the wiki would be worthwhile.
>
> ...which I intend to do within the next few days, as soon as time is
> available.
>
> In the meantime, all of the new abbreviations that I've been using can be
> found in
> the subject-lines of my recent messages. Then, in the messages, there will
> be
> explanation of what the abbreviations stand for, and definitions of the
> terms.
>
> That includes MTA, which has also been defined in more recent postings
> that likewise
> have that abbreviation in their subject-line.
>
> How hard can it be for you to find those recent subject-lines, Jameson?
>
> I often look up, in the recent archives, definitions of methods referred
> to in later postings.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> To: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:13:20 -0600
> Subject: Re: [EM] Jameson: Regarding preference criteria
> Earlier, you proposed a criterion which said that B should win in the
> following situation:
>
> 49 C
> 27 B>A
> 24 A (>B truncated)
>
> I criticized that criterion by saying that B is not the right result if
> the situation is in fact:
>
> 49 C
> 27 B>A (strategic; honest is B>C)
> 24 A (>B=C sincere)
>
> You replied that my criticism did not apply to your criterion, even though
> the votes are the same.
>
> Now you say:
>
> That's because you have no way of determinng someone's
>> preferences independent of their expression of them.
>
>
> which seems to me to be the same thing I've been arguing: that a criterion
> can only require certain results for certain (kinds of sets of) ballots,
> even if those requirements are based on some reasoning about possible
> underlying preferences.
>
> Jameson
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> To: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:21:41 -0600
> Subject: Re: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)
> You've defined the MTA method recently, but not said what the letters
> stand for.
>
> And consider that the 3-5 minutes it would take for you to find an old
> email, when you know what you're looking for, and copy and paste it to the
> wiki, are certainly less than the 2-5 minutes for someone else to do that
> without copying it to the wiki, multiplied by the number of people reading
> your posts.
>
> 2011/11/21 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
>
>>
>> >> Take it easy. Call it what you want. I've been referring to it
>> >>  according to where I'd
>> >> heard it.
>> >
>> > Interesting. Where did you hear it?
>>
>> In discussion by opponents of Approval.
>>
>
> Do you remember where? There aren't too many fora where you can throw
> around such abbreviations as easily as you can here.
>
>
>>
>>
>> >
>>
>> > ps. I still don't know what MTA stands for. I'm sure that there are
>> > plenty of people who are following this discussion less closely than I
>> > am who are even more lost in the alphabet soup than I am. I think that
>> > putting abbreviations on the wiki would be worthwhile.
>>
>> ...which I intend to do within the next few days, as soon as time is
>> available.
>>
>> In the meantime, all of the new abbreviations that I've been using can be
>> found in
>> the subject-lines of my recent messages. Then, in the messages, there
>> will be
>> explanation of what the abbreviations stand for, and definitions of the
>> terms.
>>
>> That includes MTA, which has also been defined in more recent postings
>> that likewise
>> have that abbreviation in their subject-line.
>>
>> How hard can it be for you to find those recent subject-lines, Jameson?
>>
>> I often look up, in the recent archives, definitions of methods referred
>> to in later postings.
>>
>> Mike Ossipoff
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 22:26:01 +0000
> Subject: [EM] Jameson: Regarding preference criteria
>
> Jameson--
>
> I said or implied that your criterion was un-applyable because no one can
> establish
> that someone preferred opppositely to how s/he voted.
>
> I take that back. Your criterion isn't unapplyable for that reason.
>
> After all, the failure-example-writer can say anything s/he wants to about
> any matter
> stipulated in the criterion's premise. As the failure-example-writer, you
> can say:
> "That voter prefers B to A, though voting for A, because I say so."  You,
> after all,
> are the one writing the scenario.
>
> For that reason, every method would fail your criterion
>
>
> ...or would if it were written in a way that said something.
>
> But it isn't.
>
> So, really one can only say that it isn't that you've written a criterion
> that is un-applyable.
> One can only say that you haven't written a criterion, because you haven't
> written something
> that has a meaning.
>
> Why do I say that? What do you mean by "votes for A"? Votes A over B as
> I've defined the term?
> Votes for A when the method is Plurality? (So your criterion applies only
> to Plurality?)
>
> If s/he votes A over B as I define that, then A will probably be elected,
> but not necessarily,
> depending on the method. But of course even the fact that it _could_ elect
> A (and would, with every
> method ever proposed or used), means that every method fails your
> criterion.
>
> Criteria that are necessarily failed by every method aren't at all useful.
>
> Anyway, you didn't say what you meant by "votes for A", and that means
> that you haven't
> really defined your criterion.
>
> I just wanted to tell you some things that are wrong with your criterion.
>
>
> Here are your two "definitions" of your inadequately-defined criterion.
>
> Reductio ad absurdem. One voter, two candidates. Preference-based
> criterion: "If the voter votes for A but actually prefers B, then B should
> win".
>
>
> Preference-mentioning criterion: "Imagine the voter prefers B, but due to
> an epileptic seizure, votes for A. The correct winner in this case would be
> B. Therefore, whenever we see a vote for A, we should elect B."
>
>
>
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