[EM] Re to KM wrt 3 seat Largest Remainder Hare andLoring Ensemble Rule.

[David L Wetzell]

On Fri, Nov 18, 2011 at 7:14 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet at lavabit.com> wrote:

> David L Wetzell wrote:
>
>> I blogged about this at my blog a while back in response to the args
>> given by the Electoral Reform Society of the UK against ordered party list
>> forms of PR.  http://anewkindofparty.**blogspot.com/2011/05/**
>> electoral-reform-society-**united-kingdom.html<http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/05/electoral-reform-society-united-kingdom.html>
>>
>> I think a better way to do a mixed method parliamentary election than
>> what is done in Germany is to have a large number of 4 seat
>> super-districts, where 3 seats would be elected with a 3 seat LR Hare and
>> the 4th seat would be elected by some [deliberately unspecified]
>> single-winner election rule besides FPTP.
>>
>
> That sounds a lot like the Loring Ensemble Rule. You might be interested
> in reading about it at http://www.accuratedemocracy.**com/e_ler.htm<http://www.accuratedemocracy.com/e_ler.htm>.
>

dlw:thankyou, you are far more polite than Mike O. I did look at it.  It's
similar to the second version that has essentially two separate elections,
rather than using the ranking info twice.

>
> Loring argues that Plurality councils can swing wildly and deny
> representation to people who should be represented, while PR councils can
> still be off-center due to kingmaker scenarios, and that one should
> therefore pick a center that can break ties while not giving any voting
> bloc undue power.
>

My approach replaces STV with LR Hare, I guess I don't really care whether
rankings get used or not, but I do like having fewer seats with PR with a
Hare Quota, so we can avoid those arbitrary percentage restrictions.  It
lets third parties decide who's the party-in-power but helps the
party-in-power get more seats so they can get things done if they are
generally popular, or able to win many of the single-winner elections.

>
> He then proposes to use STV, but shield the CW from losing. The Condorcet
> winner represents the center or common consensus position, while the other
> winners represent the diversity of opinion among the people. Because the
> process is done inside a single method, in the case the CW is off-center,
> the proportional representation aspect of the algorithm will even this out
> by compensating.
>

The link you gave me though tends to weigh stronger for the 2nd version,
which is easier to explain to voters by virtue of how it combines two
already existing elections...

>
> The same sort of shielding could be used in any type of multiwinner
> system. If it's sequential, you just keep the CW from being eliminated. If
> it's combinatorial (like Schulze STV), you only consider those sets of
> winners that include the CW.
>

dlw:If I was gung-ho on getting the CW elected that'd be really great, but
I don't expect great things of the ranking choices of low-info voters like
we have a lot of in the US.  Does it matter the ratios?  Cuz I really like
3:1 multi-winner and single-winner.


dlw
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20111118/c5695b88/attachment-0003.htm>