[EM] Remember toby

[Juho Laatu]

On 29.5.2011, at 3.53, fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:

> I agree with Kevin.  Winning Votes is much better and easier to defend.

Kevin Venzke referred to the number of disappointed voters on the winning side (that will be overruled in the case of a top cycle). That's one concern. I have some problems finding good explanations behind the winning votes philosophy. One problem is that also the losing side votes should have some weight. 51-49 seems almost tied and 50-0 seems almost unanimous (although only half of the voters gave their opinion on this pairwise comparison).

49: A>B
49: C
2: B>C

In this example there seem to be two large parties, one of which has two candidates (good and bad). In addition there are 2 voters that don't vote like the others do. It is not easy to me to defend the WV philosophy that B should win this election.

In margins one can discuss if 55-45 should really be equal to 15-5 but to me it seems that margins is at least roughly in the correct direction all the time anyway.

> But I still think that we should go with a method that is does not require the voters to rank the 
> candidates.
> 
> From simplest to less simple but still simple enough:
> 
> 1. Asset Voting
> 2. Approval
> 3. DYN
> 4. MCA
> 5. The Bucklin Variant of Venzke and Benham

Filling an Approval ballot is technically easier than filling a Condorcet ballot (there can be many different kind of ballots). But isn't Bucklin already in in the Condorcet category of complexity (=to give rankings or ratings to at least all potential winners)? If one has only limited number of slots available (like in some of the methods), then the interesting question is how good results will Condorcet methods give if the number of ranks is limited to some fixed number (to make voting and/or ballot format simpler).

Although Approval ballots can be simpler technically, the complexity of strategy selection in Approval may make it more complicated than Condorcet voting in the minds of some voters at least. One argument in favour of (the simplicity of) Condorcet methods is thus that usually strategic thinking is not needed. Giving one's sincere rankings is already enough and with good probability the best "strategy" for all voters.

Juho