[EM] Remember toby
fsimmons at pcc.edu
fsimmons at pcc.edu
Sat May 28 17:53:48 PDT 2011
I agree with Kevin. Winning Votes is much better and easier to defend.
But I still think that we should go with a method that is does not require the voters to rank the
candidates.
>From simplest to less simple but still simple enough:
1. Asset Voting
2. Approval
3. DYN
4. MCA
5. The Bucklin Variant of Venzke and Benham
> From: Kevin Venzke
> To: robert bristow-johnson
> Cc: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Remember Toby
> Message-ID: <952900.12451.qm at web29609.mail.ird.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
> Hi Robert,
>
> --- En date de?: Sam 28.5.11, robert bristow-johnson
> a ?crit?:
> > will minimax of margins decide differently than ranked
> > pairs?? if the cycle has only three candidates, it
> > seems to me that it must be equivalent to ranked pairs.
>
> It is the same with three.
>
> > is there any good reason to use minimax of winning votes
> > (clipped at zero) over minimax using margins?? it seems
> > to me that a candidate pairing where Candidate A just
> > squeaks by Candidate B, but where a lotta people vote should
> > have less weight than a pairing where one candidate creams
> > the other, but fewer voters weighed in on it.
>
> Margins is basically what Peter originally suggested and what I was
> trying to advise him away from.
>
> Margins on average is closer to IRV in results, WV closer to Bucklin.
> Though both are closer to each other, of course.
>
> You say you find it more obvious to drop a close contest, but
> it's only
> the winning side of that contest that's going to feel the
> outcome was
> spoiled if they get overruled. The margins idea of "what looks right"
> doesn't directly serve any purpose, yet by definition vetoes
> more voters'
> opinions than WV does, making more people wish they had just
> voted FPP
> style, or making candidates wish they hadn't entered the race.
>
> Margins elects A here:
> 35 A>B
> 25 B
> 40 C
>
> Is this going to be defensible when this method is proposed? Can you
> argue a case for A without mindreading off of the blank areas of
> the
> ballots?
>
> I don't think the tightest race is the one to drop. That could
> be the
> only race people thought mattered.
>
> Can you imagine if there were a very tight election between candidates
> "B" and "G" let's call them, but because there was a third
> candidate in
> the race we may pick the *loser* of the B-G contest?
>
> I.e. the voters give you a single majority decision (more than
> half the
> voters) and that's the one you don't respect?
>
> Kevin
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