[EM] Remember toby

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

I agree with Kevin.  Winning Votes is much better and easier to defend.

But I still think that we should go with a method that is does not require the voters to rank the 
candidates.

>From simplest to less simple but still simple enough:

1. Asset Voting
2. Approval
3. DYN
4. MCA
5. The Bucklin Variant of Venzke and Benham



> From: Kevin Venzke 
> To: robert bristow-johnson 
> Cc: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Remember Toby
> Message-ID: <952900.12451.qm at web29609.mail.ird.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
> 
> Hi Robert,
> 
> --- En date de?: Sam 28.5.11, robert bristow-johnson 
> a ?crit?:
> > will minimax of margins decide differently than ranked
> > pairs?? if the cycle has only three candidates, it
> > seems to me that it must be equivalent to ranked pairs.
> 
> It is the same with three.
> 
> > is there any good reason to use minimax of winning votes
> > (clipped at zero) over minimax using margins?? it seems
> > to me that a candidate pairing where Candidate A just
> > squeaks by Candidate B, but where a lotta people vote should
> > have less weight than a pairing where one candidate creams
> > the other, but fewer voters weighed in on it.
> 
> Margins is basically what Peter originally suggested and what I was
> trying to advise him away from.
> 
> Margins on average is closer to IRV in results, WV closer to Bucklin.
> Though both are closer to each other, of course.
> 
> You say you find it more obvious to drop a close contest, but 
> it's only
> the winning side of that contest that's going to feel the 
> outcome was
> spoiled if they get overruled. The margins idea of "what looks right"
> doesn't directly serve any purpose, yet by definition vetoes 
> more voters'
> opinions than WV does, making more people wish they had just 
> voted FPP
> style, or making candidates wish they hadn't entered the race.
> 
> Margins elects A here:
> 35 A>B
> 25 B
> 40 C
> 
> Is this going to be defensible when this method is proposed? Can you
> argue a case for A without mindreading off of the blank areas of 
> the 
> ballots?
> 
> I don't think the tightest race is the one to drop. That could 
> be the
> only race people thought mattered.
> 
> Can you imagine if there were a very tight election between candidates
> "B" and "G" let's call them, but because there was a third 
> candidate in
> the race we may pick the *loser* of the B-G contest?
> 
> I.e. the voters give you a single majority decision (more than 
> half the
> voters) and that's the one you don't respect?
> 
> Kevin