[EM] remember Toby Nixon?

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

matt welland wrote:
> On Tue, 2011-05-24 at 22:42 +0000, fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:
>> On the other hand Approval requires reliable polling information for
>> informed strategy. This fact makes Approval vulnerable to
 >> manipulation by disinformation.
> 
> Is this a generally accepted truth? I don't think I agree with it,
> can you point me to more information or explain? The only strategy in
>  approval is to hold your nose and check off the front runner you
> despise because you don't want the other front runner you despise
> more to win. But I think this is only a factor for the period after
> transitioning to approval from a plurality system. In the longer term
> both the candidates and the voters will change. I think the change
> would be for the better, candidates would generally be more
> accountable, voters need only decide who they could live with as
> leaders and it is worth it to listen to what the minority players are
> saying - giving them your vote is both possible and meaningful. I
> guess most of these would be true (perhaps more so) for asset voting
> also.

The strategy holds even when there are more than two frontrunners. 
AFAIK, the best strategy (LeGrand's strategy A) is "approve all you 
prefer to whoever has the most votes, then vote for that one if you 
prefer him to the one who has second most".

When there are only two frontrunners, that's simple enough: you vote for 
the frontrunner if you prefer him to the other guy. When there are more 
than two, however, the importance of polls increases, since you have to 
know who is currently in the lead and who is second.

In between, there could be an uncertainty point. For instance, in the 
2000 example, if Nader has no chance, you approve of him and Gore (but 
not Bush). If Nader has a lot of support, you vote for Nader alone 
because you want to make sure Gore doesn't win. But if Nader has just 
about the same chance to win as Gore, then it gets tricky.