[EM] C//A

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

Kristofer Munsterhjelmwrote ...

> Some methods pass the Condorcet criterion without seeming 
> Condorcet-like 
> at all. 

Here's a good example:

Initialize a variable X to be the candidate with the most approval.

While X is covered, let the new value of X be the highest approval candidate that covers the old X.

Elect the final value of X.

For all practical purposes this is just a seamless version of C//A, i.e. it avoids the apparent 
abandonment of Condorcet in favor of Approval after testing for a CW.


Assuming cardinal ballots, candidate  A covers candidate B, iff whenever B is rated above C on more 
ballots than not, the same is true for A, and (additionally) A beats (in this same pairwise sense) some 
candidate that B does not.