[EM] Remember Toby

[Dave Ketchum]

Having flunked on a detail Saturday, I will try to do better tonight.

This SODA is a possibility for improving Approval.

I remain a Condorcet backer:
      . What it offers is valuable to voters seeing the value of  
ranking in voting.
      . Approval voting is doable within Condorcet (and having full  
value within its capability) for those preferring to avoid actual  
ranking.

On Jun 6, 2011, at 2:51 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> 2011/6/6 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Jameson Quinn
> > 2011/6/5 Dave Ketchum
> >
> > > I see this as Approval with a complication - that Jameson
> > calls SODA. It
> > > gets a lot of thought here, including claimed Condorcet
> > compliance. I offer
> > > what I claim is a true summary of what I would call smart
> > Approval. What I
> > > see:
> > > . Candidates each offer draft Approval votes which voters
> > can know in
> > > making their decisions.
> > >
> >
> > You are close, but apparently Forest and I haven't explained the
> > system well
> > enough. Candidates offer full or truncated rankings of other
> > candidates.
> >
> > > . Vote by Approval rules.
> > > . If there is no winner, then each candidate gets to vote
> > above draft
> > > once for each ballot that bullet voted for that candidate.
> > >
Exactly what the candidates may/shall do is a topic for later design.   
It starts with:
      . Before the election the candidates define what voting they  
will do if lack of winner gives them the opportunity/duty.
      . Voters know of these promises and either do Approval voting or  
do bullet voting to have the voted for candidate vote as promised.
      . If no winner these extra votes hopefully will see to deciding  
on a winner.
>
> >
> > Candidates may vote any approval ballot consistent with the
> > ranking above
> > once for each ballot. They do so simultaneously, once, after the  
> full
> > results and all candidate's rankings have been published.
> > "Consistent with"
> > means that they simply set an approval cutoff - a lowest
> > approved candidate
> > - and all candidates above that in their ranking are approved.
> >
> > > . If a voter is thinking bullet voting, but wants to avoid
> > the above -
> > > voting also for an unreal write-in will avoid giving the
> > candidate a draft
> > > vote.
>
> Instead of an "unreal write-in" it could be a virtual candidate  
> whose name is
> "No proxy for me" meaning "I do not delegate my approvals to any  
> candidate."
> >
> > Yes.
> >
> > You've left out one extra check on this system, wherein the top
> > two approval
> > candidates are recounted in a virtual runoff without any "delegated
> > approvals" between those two.>
> > >
> > > I do not see the claimed compliance, for voters do not get to
> > do ranking.
...
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